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Although decades of empirical research has demonstrated that criminal behavior responds to incentives,
non-economists frequently express the belief that human beings are not rational enough to make calculated
decisions about the costs and benefits of engaging in crime and therefore, a priori drawing the conclusion
that criminal activity cannot be altered by incentives.  However, scientific research should not be driven
by personal beliefs. Whether or not economic conditions matter or deterrence measures such police,
arrests, prison deaths, executions, and commutations provide signals to people is an empirical question,
which should be guided by a solid theoretical framework.  In this paper we extend the analysis of Mocan
and Gittings (2003).  We alter the original model in a number of directions to make the relationship
between homicide rates and death penalty related outcomes (executions, commutations and removals)
disappear.  We deliberately deviate from the theoretically consistent measurement of the risk variables
originally employed by Mocan and Gittings (2003) in a variety of ways. We also investigate the sensitivity
of the results to changes in the estimation sample (removing high executing states for example) and
weighting.  The basic results are insensitive to these and a variety of other specification tests performed
in the paper.  The results are often strong enough to even hold up under theoretically meaningless
measurements of the risk variables.   In summary, the original findings of Mocan and Gittings (2003)
are robust, providing evidence that people indeed react to incentives induced by capital punishment.
Research findings about the deterrent effect of the death penalty evoke strong feelings, which could
be due to political, ideological, religious, or other personal beliefs.  Yet, such findings do not mean
that capital punishment is good or bad, nor does it provide any judgment about whether capital punishment
should be implemented or abolished.  It is simply a scientific finding which demonstrates that people















The Impact of Incentives on Human Behavior:  Can We Make It Disappear? 
The Case of the Death Penalty 
 
“Get your facts first, and then you can distort ‘em as much as you please.” 
Mark Twain as quoted by Rudyard Kipling in From Sea to Sea (1914, p.180) 
 
I. Introduction 
Economists are interested in the investigation of human behavior and how 
individuals respond to prices and incentives.   Economic theory, which demonstrates an 
inverse relationship between the price of a commodity and its consumption, similarly 
suggests that an increase in the price or cost of a behavior leads to a reduction in the 
intensity of that behavior.  Therefore, as economic analysis of consumer behavior is 
applicable to any commodity ranging from apples to cars, it is also applicable to any type 
of human behavior, ranging from drunk driving to sexual activity to marital dissolution.  
Based on economic theory, an immense amount of empirical research has investigated 
the extent to which individuals alter their behavior in response to increases in the relevant 
“prices” that may impact that behavior. 
 
Rationality and Reaction to Incentives 
One common argument made by non-economists against the economic approach 
to human behavior is that people are not rational enough to behave according to the 
predictions of economic theory when it comes to behaviors such as smoking, 
consumption of alcohol and illicit drugs, sexual activity and crime.  However, an 
enormous empirical literature in economics has demonstrated that even these behaviors 
are responsive to prices and incentives.  For example, consumption of cigarettes declines  
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when cigarette prices rise (e.g., Becker, Murphy and Grossman, 1994; Yurekli and Zhang 
2000; Gruber, Sen, and Stabile, 2003), alcohol consumption is curtailed when alcohol 
prices are increased (e.g., Farrell, Manning and Finch 2003, Manning, Blumberg and 
Moulton 1995), drug use responds to variations in drug prices, (e.g., van Ours 1995; 
Saffer and Chaloupka 1999; Grossman 2005), pregnancies and childbearing are 
influenced by state and federal policies that alter the costs (e.g. Mellor 1998; Lundberg 
and Plotnick 1995), and the timing of births within a year is responsive to the tax benefit 
of having a child (Dickert-Conlin and Chandra, 1999).   Such results hold true even in 
sub-populations such as adolescents, who are thought to be present-oriented and less 
rational (e.g., Pacula et al. 2001; Gruber and Zinman 2001; Grossman and Chaloupka 
1998; Grossman et al. 1994; Lundberg and Plotnick 1990), and among individuals with 
mental health problems (Saffer and Dave 2005).   In a different vein, research in 
experimental economics has demonstrated that individuals respond to changes in prices 
as predicted by economic theory, and even children behave rationally when modifying 
their behavior in response to variations in prices (Harbaugh et al. 2001). 
The same results are obtained from analyses of the response of criminal activity to 
the relevant costs and benefits.  The pioneering work of Becker (1968) indicates that 
criminal activity should decline as the “price” of such activity increases.  In his Nobel 
Lecture on December 9, 1992, Becker stated that 
“In the 1950s and 1960s intellectual discussions of crime 
were dominated by the opinion that criminal behavior was caused by 
mental illness and social oppression, and that criminals were helpless 
“victims.”… I explored instead the theoretical and empirical 
implications of the assumption that criminal behavior is rational (see 
the early pioneering work by Bentham [1931] and Beccaria [1986]), 
but again “rationality” did not necessarily imply narrow materialism. 
It recognized that many people are constrained by moral and ethical  
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considerations, and did not commit crimes even when they were 
profitable and there was no danger of detection.   However, police 
and jails would be unnecessary if such attitudes always prevailed.  
Rationality implied that some individuals become criminals because 
of the financial rewards from crime compared to legal work, taking 
into account of the likelihood of apprehension and conviction, and 
the severity of punishment.” 
 
   Empirical analyses testing the economic model of crime have demonstrated that 
illicit behavior indeed responds to incentives and sanctions.  For example, Jacob and 
Levitt (2003) show that incentives for high test scores motivated teachers and 
administrators to cheat on standardized tests in Chicago public schools. Corman and 
Mocan (2000, 2005) and DiTella and Schargrodsky (2004) demonstrate that increased 
arrests and more police officers reduce crime.   Levitt (1998a) shows that juvenile crime 
goes down when punishment gets stiffer.  Grogger (1998) and Mocan and Rees (2005) 
find that the extent of criminal involvement among high school students is influenced by 
both economic conditions and deterrence.  Similarly, it has been shown that prison 
crowding, which generates early release of prisoners, has a significant impact on crime 
rates (Levitt 1996).  
One specific sub-analysis in this domain has received significant attention.  
Specifically, the extent to which homicide rates respond to deterrence was first 
investigated theoretically and empirically by Ehrlich (1973, 1975, 1977), who found a 
deterrent effect of capital punishment.  Some analysts questioned the robustness of the 
results (Hoenack and Weiler 1980; Passell and Taylor, 1977), and Ehrlich and others 
responded to these criticisms (Ehrlich and Mark 1977, Ehrlich and Brower 1987, Ehrlich 
and Liu 1999). 
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Robustness of Research Findings 
Because no one single research paper can provide the final answer to a  particular 
scientific question, it is always important for second-generation researchers to investigate 
the robustness of the findings in the original work.  Recent examples of such activity 
include the debate on the impact of guns on crime, and the relationship between abortion 
and crime.  Lott and Mustard (1997) reported evidence on the negative impact of 
concealed weapons laws on crime.  Subsequently, other researchers investigated the 
robustness of the original results (Plassmann and Tideman 2001; Moody 2001; Ayres and 
Donohue III 2003; Plassmann and Whitley 2003).  Similarly, following the paper by 
Donohue III and Levitt (2001) which documents a negative relationship between abortion 
and crime, a debate has surged whether the findings are reflective of a causal impact 
(Joyce 2004a; Donohue III and Levitt 2004b; Joyce 2004; Foote and Goetz 2005; 
Donohue III and Levitt 2006).
1   
Along the same lines, in a recent article Donohue III and Wolfers (2006)  
(D-III&W hereafter) focus on a number of papers that reported a deterrent effect of death 
penalty on homicide, and claim that the findings of these papers are not robust.  One 
section of the D-III&W piece concentrates on Mocan and Gittings (2003), but it does not 
provide an accurate representation of the findings of Mocan and Gittings (2003), or the 
robustness of the results.  The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed sensitivity 
analysis regarding the impact of leaving death row (executions, commutations and other 
removals from death row) on state homicide rates.  Specifically, we make various 
                                                 
1 Examples of other debates include the impact of the minimum wage laws and the schooling 
reform.  
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attempts to eliminate the deterrent effect of capital punishment and investigate if and 
under what conditions one succeeds in eliminating the impact of leaving death row on the 
homicide rate. 
  As we demonstrate in detail below, the signaling effect of leaving death row and 
its impact on homicide is robust.  Although the impact of executions disappears when one 
estimates peculiar specifications as was done by D-III&W (which are inconsistent with 
theory), the impact of commutations remains significant even in those  models. And, as 
described in the paper in detail, and summarized in Table 15, in many cases the results do 
not disappear under other specifications that have no theoretical foundation. 
 
II. The Empirical  Model 
Following Mocan and Gittings (2003), the investigation of the impact of 
deterrence on homicide is carried out by estimating models of the following form: 
(1) MURDERit = Dit-1 β + Xit Ω +μi +ηt +Ρit+ε it, 
where MURDERit  is the homicide rate in state i and year t.  The vector X contains state 
characteristics that may be correlated with criminal activity, including the unemployment 
rate, real per capita income, the proportion of the state population in the following age 
groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and over, the proportion of the state population in 
urban areas, the proportion which is black, the infant mortality rate, the party affiliation 
of the governor, and the legal drinking age in the state.  Theoretical and empirical 
justification for the inclusion of these variables can be found in Levitt  
(1998a), and Lott and Mustard (1997).   The variable μi represents unobserved state-
specific characteristics that impact the murder rate, and ηt  represents year effects.  To  
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control for the impact of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, a dummy variable is 
included which takes the value of one in Oklahoma in 1995 and zero elsewhere.  The 
models also include state-specific time-trends represented by Ρit.  
 
Measurement of risks (increase and decrease in the cost of murder) 
The vector D represents deterrence variables, and includes the probability of 
apprehension, the probability of sentencing given apprehension, as well as various 
probabilities pertaining to leaving death row, conditional on sentencing.   
It is important to note that execution is not the only outcome for prisoners on 
death row.  During the period of 1977-97 (the time period analyzed), among the inmates 
who completed their duration on death row, 17 percent were executed.   The other 83 
percent left death row for other reasons (e.g. commutation of the sentence, sentence or 
conviction being overturned, sentence being found unconstitutional).  This information 
allows for an investigation as to how the murder rate reacts to an increase in the price of 
crime (executions) and a decrease in the price of crime (commutation, and all removals 
other than executions and deaths).   
It is important to define these probabilities appropriately at the outset.  Once their 
proper measurements are understood, they can be manipulated to make the deterrence 
result disappear.  The first one of these probabilities is the probability of apprehension 
given committing murder.  The second one is the probability of conviction given 
apprehension, and the third one is the probability of execution (or commutation) given 
conviction.  
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The probability of apprehension is a measure of the risk of getting caught, given 
that a murder is committed.  Because the unit of analysis is state-year, this probability is 
measured as the proportion of murders cleared by an arrest in a particular state and year; 
i.e. ARRATEt =(ARt/MURt), where ARt is the number of homicide arrests in a state in 
year t (state subscript is dropped for ease of exposition), and MURt  stands for the number 
of homicides in year t.    
The second risk variable is the probability of receiving a death sentence, given 
that a murder arrest took place.  This probability is measured as the proportion of people 
convicted for murder from the pool of individuals who were arrested for murder.
2   After 
a person is arrested for murder, he/she does not automatically end up on death row.  
Instead, a trial takes place.  Furthermore, each person who goes to trial is not 
automatically found guilty.  Therefore, one can calculate the probability of being found 
guilty and being sentenced to death following a trial, conditional on being arrested for 
murder.  The average duration between the date of a murder arrest and the date on which 
an inmate is sentenced to death is more than one year.
3  Thus, the risk of receiving the 
death sentence is defined as the number of death sentences handed out in a year divided 
by the number of murder arrests two years prior. That is, SENTRATEt= (SENTt/ARt-2), 
where SENTt   represents the number of death sentences handed out in year t. 
If a person receives the death sentence after the trial, he/she is not executed 
instantly.  Ignoring this point (as was done by D-III&W) will be helpful in attempts to 
make some of the results disappear.  But the reality is, researchers recognized that the 
                                                 
2 That is, if 100 individuals are arrested for murder and 10 of them are subsequently convicted, 
the risk of conviction is 10%. 
3 For example, a person who is arrested in October 1990, is likely to receive a death sentence 
after February 1992.  
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average duration on death row is about six years (Bedau 1997, Dezhbakhsh, Rubin and 
Shepherd 2003, Mocan and Gittings 2003, Argys and Mocan 2004).  About 83 percent of 
the inmates are removed from death row for reasons other than execution.  One such 
reason is commutation, where the inmate is granted clemency and the sentence is 
changed to a prison term, typically life.   Because commutation implies a reduced risk of 
death, and therefore a reduced cost of committing murder, an increase in the probability 
of commutations should theoretically increase the homicide rate.    The same argument is 
true for all removals from death row (other than executions and other deaths while on 
death row).    
Therefore, following Mocan and Gittings (2003), three death penalty-related 
deterrence variables are created.  The first one is the risk of execution conditional on 
being sentenced to death, the second one is the risk of being commuted conditional on 
being sentenced to death, and the third one is the risk of being removed from death row 
for reasons other than execution or other death conditional on being sentenced to death.  
This third measure includes commutations, but is more comprehensive as it also includes 
removals due to overturned sentence or conviction, or sentence being found 
unconstitutional.  According to economic theory, an increase in the first variable (the risk 
of execution) should decrease the homicide rate as it makes murder more costly. On the 
other hand, an increase in the second and third variables is expected to increase the 
murder rate because an increase in the commutation or removal rate is associated with a 
reduction in the cost of homicide.   
Donohue III and Wolfers (2006) employ the data and methods of Mocan and 
Gittings (2003), but they do not carefully consider the timing of events.   They create  
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these variables as the ratio of executions (or removals) in a given year to the number of 
death sentences in that same year, i.e. as (EXECt/SENTt), or (REMOVEt  / SENTt).  
Although useful in making the deterrence results disappear, these variables have no 
meaning.  This is because the numerator and denominator of the ratio have no connection 
to each other.  As discussed above, individuals who are sentenced to death in a given year 
are not at risk of execution in that same year.  However, by employing the ratio of 
executions in year t to the death sentences in year t, D-III&W assume that execution of 
each inmate takes place in the same year he/she was sentenced to death.  As mentioned 
earlier, the reality is that, after being sentenced to death, on average, death row inmates 
face the event of execution or commutation about six years later; and the average 
duration on death row for those who are removed from death row for reasons other than 
death or execution is about five years (see Figure 10, which displays the progression of 
the average duration on death row over time). 
Although calculating these probabilities as was done by D-III&W is not sensible, 
it would be reasonable to ask if the results were sensitive to variations in their proper 
measurement.   Specifically, we will consider variations in the probability of execution, 
the probability of commutation, and the probability of removal from death row in three 
different dimensions, and will investigate if these variations make the results disappear.  
First, we will change the denominator of the risk variables to investigate if the results 
disappear when we calculate the risks of execution, commutation and removals as 
(EXECt/SENTt-5), (COMMt/SENTt-5), (REMOVEt/SENTt-5), assuming a five-year wait 
on death row, and (EXECt/SENTt-4), (COMMt/SENTt-4), (REMOVEt/SENTt-4), assuming 
a four-year wait.   Put differently, we will investigate the sensitivity of the results to the  
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change in denominator of the risk variable, which is the average duration on death row. 
By doing so, we move the lag lengths of the risk variables towards the direction favored 
by D-III&W.  Second, we will analyze whether alterations in the measurement of 
execution risk, commutation risk and removal risk make the result disappear if the 
numerators of these ratios are changed.    
As described in detail in Mocan and Gittings (2003) an advantage of these data is 
the availability of the date of each execution and removal, which enables one to create 
execution, commutation and removal measures that are consistent with theory.  If 
executions, commutations or removals from death row send signals to potential criminals, 
then the timing of the signal is important.  For example, an execution which took place in 
January of 1980 can have an impact on the homicide rate for the full year of 1980.  
However, if the execution took place in December 1980, it will have a trivial impact on 
the 1980 homicide rate.  Rather, the impact of this December execution on murder will be 
felt in 1981.  Therefore, executions, commutations and removals are prorated based on 
the month in which they occurred.  As above, an execution that took place in January 
1980 is expected to impact the state homicide rate for the entire twelve months in 1980.  
Therefore we count this execution as a full execution in 1980.  In contrast, if an execution 
took place in November 1980, it is assumed that its deterrent impact on homicide is felt 
during the subsequent 12-month period.  Thus, this November execution counts as 2/12 
of an execution for 1980 and 10/12 of an execution for 1981.  The same algorithms are 
applied for commutations and removals.   We call these the first measure of executions, 
commutations and removals. (This is the measure employed by Mocan and Gittings 2003, 
and also Donohue III and Wolfers 2006).   
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As another measure, we created the following algorithm: If an execution took 
place within the first three quarters of a year, we attributed that execution to the same 
year.  If the execution took place in the last quarter of a year (October-December) we 
attributed that execution to the following year under the assumption that the relative 
impact on murders would be felt in the following year.  The same was done for removals 
and commutations.  We name these the second measures of executions, commutations 
and removals (EXEC2, COMM2 and REMOVE2). 
 
III.  Let’s Make it Disappear 
We estimate various versions of Equation (1).  As was done in Mocan and 
Gittings (2003), each specification controls for the following variables:  The murder 
arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the unemployment rate, real per capita income, the 
proportion of the state population in the following age groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 
55 and over, the proportion of the state population in urban areas, the proportion which is 
black, the infant mortality rate, governor’s party affiliation, and the legal drinking age in 
the state.  We control for state fixed-effects, a common time trend, state-specific time 
trends, a dummy variable to control for the impact of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, 
the number of prisoners per violent crime as well as the prison death rate: a measure of 
prison conditions.  These last two variables are included as additional measures of 
deterrence, following Levitt (1998a), and Katz, Levitt and Shustorovich (2003).    
Following Corman and Mocan (2000), Levitt (1998a), Katz Levitt and 
Shistorovich (2003),  and Mocan and Gittings (2003), the deterrence variables are lagged  
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by one year to minimize the concerns of simultaneity.  For example, if the risk variable is 
(EXECt/SENTt-5), its lagged value is employed in the regressions  
[i.e. (EXECt/SENTt-5)-1 = (EXECt-1/SENTt-6)].  The models are estimated with weighted-
least squares, where the weights are state’s share in the U.S. population.  Robust standard 
errors, which are clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses under the 
coefficients.  In the interest of space, only the coefficients and standard errors pertaining 
to executions, commutations and removals are reported. 
Table 1A displays the results where the first measures of execution, commutation 
and removal are employed.  These are the same measures used by Mocan and Gittings 
(2003) and D-III&W.  The only difference between D-III&W’s specification, the 
specification used by Mocan and Gittings (2003), and the one reported in Table 1A is the 
denominator of the execution, commutation and removal rates.  Specifically, the top 
panel of Table 1A measures the relevant risks as (EXECt/SENTt-5), (COMMt/SENTt-5), 
(REMOVEt/SENTt-5).  That is, it calculates the rates of execution, commutation and 
removal per death sentences imposed 5 years earlier (assuming that the average duration 
on death row is 5 years).  The models presented in the middle panel of Table 1A are 
identical, except, the average duration on death row is assumed to be 4 years.  Thus, the 
variables are calculated as (EXECt/SENTt-4), (COMMt/SENTt-4),    and 
(REMOVEt/SENTt-4).
4    
A number of aspects of the results in Table 1A are noteworthy.  First, the point 
estimates are very robust between specifications reported in the top two panels.  Second, 
                                                 
4 Mocan and Gittings (2003) employed risk variables that take the average duration on death row as six 
years (denominator SENT lagged six years) in models for executions and commutations.  Because the time 
between sentencing and REMOVE from death row is about 5 years, they employed SENT lagged five years 
in the denominator when the model included removals.  Dohonue III and Wolfers (2006), on the other 
hand, use zero lags of SENT in the denominator.  
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the execution rate has a negative and statistically significant impact on the murder rate.  
Third, the commutation and removal rates have positive impacts on the homicide rate.  
Fourth, these results are consistent with the specifications reported in Mocan and Gittings 
(2003), despite different lag lengths of the denominator (i.e. despite the fact that duration 
on death row is assumed to be shorter than it really is). 
The bottom panel of Table 1A displays the results of the model estimated by  
D-III&W using the same data.  In this specification, the execution, commutation and 
removal rates are calculated by dividing executions, commutations and removals in a 
year to the number of death sentences in that same year. Thus, they assume that the 
duration on death row is less than one year.  Similarly, in their specification, D-III&W 
calculate the sentencing rate as the ratio of death sentences in a year to murder arrests in 
that same year, assuming that the time length from arrest-to-trial-to-sentencing is less 
than one year.  This bizarre specification allows the execution result disappear, but even 
this specification cannot eliminate the impact of commutations on the homicide rate.
   
Note that the equation on page 816 of D-III&W includes a variable called 
(Pardonst-1 /DeathSentencest-7).  D-III&W write that Mocan and Gittings (2003) estimate 
that particular regression, although Mocan and Gittings (2003) do not employ pardons in 
their paper.   Similarly, Table 6 of D-III&W contains specifications in which a variable 
named “Pardons” is included, and a discussion is provided about pardons.
5   Mocan and 
Gittings (2003) employed commutations in their regressions, not pardons.   
Commutations and pardons are two unrelated events.  A pardon invalidates the guilt and 
                                                 
5  For example, Donohue III and Wolfers state on page 818 that  “… the two related measures of 
the porosity of the death sentence now yield sharply different results, with the pardon rate 
(emphasis added) robustly and positively associated with homicide…”  
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the punishment of the inmate.  A commutation reduces the severity of punishment; it is 
clemency, in which the sentence is reduced, typically to life in prison. 
Table 1B reports results obtained from models where the executions, 
commutations and removals are measured differently.  Here we employ the second set of 
variables as described in Section II above.  In other words, the only difference between 
results reported in Table1A and Table1B is the measurement of the numerator of the 
execution, commutation, and removal rates.  Once again, the impact of the execution 
rates does not disappear, unless one estimates the peculiar specification promoted by D-
III&W; and similar to Table 1A, even in this case, the impact of the commutation rate on 
the homicide rate is positive and statistically significant. 
 
 
All Executions are in Texas 
Donohue III and Wolfers (2006) write that California and Texas are very 
interesting states which contain substantial and useful information for establishing the 
deterrent effect of the death penalty, but suggest that the results may be sensitive to 
exclusion of Texas and California from the analysis (D-III&W p.826).  Table 2A displays 
the results obtained from models estimated with two different death row durations, and 
two different ways to measure risk.  Therefore, Table 2A is comparable to the top two 
panels in Tables 1A and 1B with one difference: Texas is omitted from the models.  
Table 2B is similar to Table 2A, except these regressions omit California.  As the tables 
demonstrate, these attempts to make the results disappear are not successful either.  As 
another attempt at disappearance, we excluded both Texas and California, and ran the  
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regressions without both states.  The results, reported in Table 2C, show that the impact 
of executions and commutations or removals are still significant when Texas and 
California are both omitted from the analysis. 
 
The Importance of the Denominator Once Again 
Why is it the case that omitting Texas does not make the results disappear despite 
the fact that Texas executes a disproportionately large number of death row inmates?  
One obvious fallacy is to focus on executions when the correct measure is not the number 
of executions, but the risk of the execution.  Put differently, the number of executions 
needs to be adjusted by the appropriate denominator, which is the number of death 
sentences relevant for the cohort of death row inmates.  Despite the fact that a particular 
state has a large number of executions, the execution risk may not be high if the cohort of 
inmates that was sentences to death 4-5 years earlier is also large. 
In Table 3 we summarize the number of executions, commutation, and removals 
from death row for other reasons between 1977 and 1997 for selected states; and also 
present the average execution risk in each state during that period.  The first measure is 
the number of executions in year t divided by number of death sentences 4 years earlier.  
The second measure deflates the number of executions by death sentences 5 years prior.  
The third and fourth measures displayed in the table are the number of executions divided 
by prison population (EXECt/PRISONt), and the number of executions deflated by the 
number of inmates on death row in the same year (EXECt/ROWt), respectively.  We will 
discuss the relevance of these last two measures in detail below, but suffice it to say that 
Texas is not the highest ranked state by any of these execution risks.  It is ranked 4
th or  
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5
th, depending on the risk measure, behind Virginia, Arkansas, and Louisiana.  Missouri 
is generally ranked as the 5
th state in execution risk.  Therefore attempts to make the 
results disappear would be more productive if one were to omit these states. 
Tables 4A-4C present the results obtained from models when Virginia, Arkansas 
or Louisiana are dropped, respectively.  In each case, dropping these states does not 
influence the results.  That is, even when we remove the high-risk states from the 
analysis, the results are still robust.  This may not be all that surprising, as the coefficients 
are estimated through the variations in the variables within a state. 
This analysis shows that attempts to make the deterrence results disappear are 
ineffective.  Even if one estimates an unusual specification as was done by D-III&W 
(replicated in the bottom panels of Table 1A and Table 1B) the estimated impact of 
executions becomes statistically insignificant, but the positive impact of commutations on 
the murder rate does not disappear. 
 
IV. The Impact of Death Penalty Laws 
Donohue III and Wolfers (2006) indicate in their paper that they use our data and 
programs and analyze “the death penalty effects” separately for each state, making sure to 
control for the same variables as in [the] main specification.”  They claim that what they 
find is the following: homicide rates were higher in Kansas and New Hampshire after 
these states adopted the death penalty; lower in New York and New Jersey after their 
adoption of the death penalty; and homicide rates declined in Massachusetts and Rhode 
Island after these states abolished the death penalty (D-III&W, p. 809).    
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In making this claim, D-III&W do not report any regression results.  We 
estimated various models in an effort to substantiate their assertion.  Because they 
indicate that they estimated the impact of the death penalty laws separately for each of 
the mentioned states controlling for the same variables as in the main models, we 
estimated models separately for Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Kansas, New Hampshire, 
New York and New Jersey.  For each state a dummy variable is created that takes the 
value of one if the death penalty is legal, and zero otherwise.  Kansas legalized the death 
penalty in 1994.  New Hampshire legalized it in 1991.  Legalization took place in 1982 
and 1995 for New Jersey and New York, respectively.  Massachusetts and Rhode Island 
abolished the death penalty in 1984.
6  Because the sample runs from 1977 to 1997, 
running regressions for each state separately is complicated by a degrees-of-freedom 
problem.  Nevertheless, in an effort to verify the statement of D-III&W, we ran five 
different models for each state while varying the number of control variables.  The results 
are reported in Tables 5A-5F.  The number of control variables differs between the 
specifications to investigate the sensitivity.  The sentencing rate could only be included in 
the regressions for New Jersey, because there is no variation in the number of death 
sentences in the five other states.  Similarly, the drinking age cannot be included in the 
models. As the tables show, inclusion or exclusion of control variables has no substantial 
impact on the estimated coefficients of legal death penalty indicator.  In these 
regressions, the coefficient of the death penalty indicator is not statistically different from 
zero in Kansas, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York.  It is negative and 
significant in New Hampshire and New Jersey.  Thus, these results strikingly contradict 
                                                 
6  Massachusetts abolished the death penalty in October 1984.  Thus, 1985 is the first year with 
no death penalty in Massachusetts in the data since abolishment took place.  Similarly, 1985 is the 
first full year where the death penalty is illegal in Rhode Island.  
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the claim of D-III&W.  For example, D-III&W claim that the adoption of the death 
penalty increased the homicide rate in Kansas, whereas Table 5A demonstrates that the 
impact was to reduce the homicide rate (by the sign of the coefficients), or at best, was 
not statistically significant. Regardless, the results suggest that the impact was certainly 
not to increase in homicide rate in Kansas.  D-III&W make the same claim for New 
Hampshire that there was an increase in the homicide rate after the adoption of capital 
punishment.  Table 5B, though, suggests just the opposite.  The same is true for their 
claims pertaining to other states, with the exception of New Jersey.  D-III&W write that 
the abolishment of the death penalty reduced the homicide rate in Massachusetts and 
Rhode Island.  Tables 5C and 5D, however, demonstrate that the impact, although not 
significant, is in the opposite direction of their claim: the homicide rate was lower when 
the death penalty was legal in those states, not higher, although it is not estimated with 
precision.  Only New Jersey is consistent with their claim (Table 5F), as the adoption of 
the death penalty generated a decline in the homicide rate. 
How could D-III&W’s claims be so different from those obtained from regression 
results?  It is possible that D-III&W based their statement on a different type of analysis.  
Somewhere else in their paper, while discussing a different work, they mention that 
dummy variables are created for each “experiment” of death penalty adoption or abolition 
in a state, which takes the value of one for that state subsequent to the law change.
7  Thus, 
in that analysis, they examine the impact of each state-specific intervention by pooling all 
the data.  Following this logic, we created six state-specific dummy variables (one for 
each state mentioned), which take the value of one for a particular state after the law 
change in that state.  Pooling all the data and estimating models with all control variables 
                                                 
7  Page 807, where D-III&W discuss Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd (2004).  
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and also adding these intervention variables produced coefficients for these 
“experiments” that were consistent with the D-III&W statement, but their statistical 
significance was not.  Specifically, the p-values of coefficients of the “experiment” 
variables in Massachusetts and Rhode Island were 0.23, and 0.40, respectively.    
Thus, it appears that D-III&W’s statement is based on point estimates, 
disregarding the statistical in-significance of these estimates.  Ignoring this issue, we 
should point out that many of these point estimates conflict with those reported in Tables 
5A-5F.  We suggest the following explanation.  Their “experiment” variable is an 
interaction between the state dummy and the legal dummy to indicate the legality of 
death penalty in that state.  However, it seems like D-III&W do not fully interact the state 
dummy with the other right hand side variables.  That is, they implicitly assume that the 
effects of all the other right hand side variables (arrest rate, unemployment rate, 
sentencing rate, percent black, etc.) are the same across states.  This could be a major 
concern for the meaningfulness of estimates obtained from pooled data if the restrictive 
assumption that the secondary effects of the other control variables are zero turns out to 
be incorrect.  A fully-interacted model does not make this assumption, nor does running 
the regressions separately for each state.   However, because a common time component 
across states is estimated in the pooled data, one can no longer obtain the usual one-to-
one mapping between the estimates of the fully interacted model and those from the state-
specific regressions.  
In an attempt to find a middle ground, we estimated the fully interacted model and 
included time dummies.  Unfortunately, the model is so saturated that many of the 
estimates are no longer identified due to collinearities.  However, as one moves from the  
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D-III&W pooled model and includes more and more secondary effects the results change 
significantly. For example, when we estimated the pooled regression where the state 
dummies are interacted with only two explanatory variables (homicide arrest rate and 
prisoners per violent crime), the coefficient for Kansas became insignificant, the 
coefficients on New Hampshire and New York flipped signs and were significant, and the 
coefficient on New Jersey became insignificant. 
As an alternative analysis of the direction of the impact of each state’s death 
penalty laws, we performed an interrupted time-series analysis. Figures 1A and 2A 
present the time-series behavior of the homicide rates in Kansas and New Hampshire 
since 1960.  These states legalized the death penalty in 1994 and in 1991, respectively.   
Although D-III&W assert that the homicide rate went up in these states after the 
legalization, Figures 1A and 2A suggest that the opposite may be the case.   D-III&W 
write that the homicide rates went down in New York and New Jersey after legalization 
(Figures 3A and 4A), but they claim the homicide rates also went down in Massachusetts 
and Rhode Island (presented in Figures 5A and 6A) due to the abolishment of the death 
penalty.  Figure 5A shows that there was an increase in the homicide rate in 
Massachusetts after the law change, followed by a drop in 1997.  It is uncertain whether 
this drop can be attributable to the change in law 12 years prior.  In the case of Rhode 
Island, the homicide rate is fluctuating around a quadratic trend, and the level of the 
homicide rate seems to have increased, rather than decreased, after the abolition. 
To investigate if the “experiment” in a state has altered the behavior of the 
homicide rate in that state over time, we employed well-defined intervention analysis 
methods.  The time-series dynamics of the homicide rate of each state can be modeled  
21 
separately, and intervention variables can be added to investigate if the change in the 
death penalty law in that state in a particular year has altered the time-series dynamics of 
the homicide rate in that state.  Following Mocan and Topyan (1993), Mocan (1994), 
Harvey and Durbin (1986),  Let Mt  stand for the homicide rate in a particular state in year 
t.  The dynamics of Mt  over time can be expressed by Equation (2) below where μt 
represents slowly-evolving trend component of the homicide rate, Ωt  stands for the cycle-
component, and εt  is regular random component.  
(2)    t t t t M ε μ + Ω + =  
The trend in the homicide rate, μt, is determined by its level and the slope in each time 
period, which can be written in general as random walks as in Equation (3). 
(3)   
t t t
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A flexible method to model the cyclical behavior of the homicide rate, represented by Ω 
in Equation (2), is to assume a stochastic trigonometric process, which is depicted by 
Equation (4). 
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where ρ is a damping factor with 0≤ ρ≤1, λc is the frequency of the cycle in radians, and 
τt and  τt
* are independently, identically distributed disturbances with mean zero and 
variance σt
2. 
The model can be extended by adding an intervention variable to investigate the 
impact of an event that took place in period k.  The immediate pulse effect of the 
intervention can be modeled by employing the variable ωt defined as ωt=0 if t≠k, and  
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ωt=1 if t=k.  If the intervention shifts the level of the variable, then the intervention 
variable ωt is defined as  ωt=0 if t≠k, and ωt=1 if t≥ k, and   t t t t t η δω β μ μ + + + = − − 1 1 . 
We estimated the model, depicted by Equations (2)-(4) by including the 
intervention variables.  The models are first estimated from 1977 forward to be consistent 
with the time period used in the earlier analyses.  The estimated trend values along with 
actual data are displayed in Figures 1B-6B.  As can be seen, in the four states that 
adopted the death penalty, the “experiment” had altered the dynamics of the homicide 
rate by reducing its level.  In the two states that abolished the death penalty on the other 
hand, the level of the homicide rate has increased.
8   
As another set of analyses, we estimated the models starting in 1960, except for 
New York, where the data are available starting in 1965.  This allows us to investigate the 
impact of the adoption of the death penalty in South Dakota (in 1979), New Mexico (in 
1979) and in Oregon (in 1978).   Furthermore, we can also jointly investigate the impact 
of the 1972 Supreme Court moratorium.  The results are presented graphically in Figures 
1C-9C.   In each case, the Furman decision is associated with an increase in the level of 
the homicide rate.  Consistent with the dynamics presented in Figures 1B-6B, adoption of 
the death penalty generated declines in the homicide trends, and abolition in 
Massachusetts and Rhode Island produced increases in the homicide rate, although long-
run trends in these series generated subsequent declines. 
                                                 
8 Although the death penalty was legal during period before 1984 in Massachusetts, the 1970s 
and 1980s witnessed a series of legislation and judicial rulings regarding the death penalty. 
Identifying these time intervals and considering interventions associated with them did not alter 
the picture depicted in Figure 5B.  The same, to a lesser degree, is true for Rhode Island where 
the death penalty was re-enacted in 1977, but in 1979 the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued the 
opinion of the violation of the prohibitions of the 8
th amendment of the U.S. constitution (Rhode 
Island Secretary of State web site).  Adding this potential intervention did not alter the picture 
depicted in Figure 6B.  
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Evidence from Panel Data 
In this section, we investigate whether the existence of the death penalty in a state 
has a separate impact on the homicide rate in addition to the risks associated with being 
on the death row.  To that end, we estimated the same models as those presented in 
Tables 1A-4C, but we added a dichotomous indicator if death penalty is legal in a given 
state in a particular year.  Furthermore, we interacted this dummy variable with the 
execution rate, commutation rate and removal rate variables.  These specifications are 
estimated by Mocan and Gittings (2003) who deflated by risk measures by death 
sentences given six years earlier (SENTt-6) in models with executions and commutations, 
and by death sentences five years earlier in models with removals.  
The results are displayed in Tables 6A and 6B, where the two alternative 
measures of execution, commutation and removal risks are employed.  In each case, 
models are estimated with 4 and 5-lags of the death sentences in the denominator of the 
risk variables as before.  The results demonstrate that the existence of the death penalty in 
a state has a negative and statistically significant impact on the homicide rate.  In 
addition, the execution rate has a negative impact on the homicide rate, and 
commutations and removals have a positive impact, although not always statistically 
significant.  Once again, these results are consistent with those reported by Mocan and 
Gittings (2003). 
 
V.  The Denominator of the Risk Variables Again 
Although not realized by D-III&W, individuals who received a death sentence do 
not exit the death row in the same year as they received the death sentence.  To make the  
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point more visible, the average duration on death row is calculated each year for those 
inmates who are removed that year, and plotted in Figure 10 by the reason of exit.   As 
can be inferred, individuals who were commuted, executed or otherwise removed from 
death row had spent an average of about six years on death row.  On the other had, those 
who were executed or commuted in 1997 had completed about 11 years on death row.   
Given this picture, one can use time-varying durations on death row to calculate the risks 
of execution, commutation or removals.  For example, the execution risk in year 1981 
can be calculated as the number of executions in 1981 divided by the number of death 
sentences in 1980 (because the duration on death row was one year in 1981).  On the 
other hand, the risk of execution in 1990 can be measured as the number of executions in 
1990 divided by the number of death sentences in 1982 (because the average duration on 
death row for those who were executed in 1990 was 8 years. See Figure 10).  More 
generally, the execution, commutation and removal rates are calculated as  
(EXECt / SENTt-i), (COMMt / SENTt-j), and (REMOVEt / SENTt-k), where i, j and k are 
average durations on death row for spells ending in year t for executions, commutations 
and removals, respectively.  Calculating the risks this way produced the results displayed 
in Table 7.  Once again, we are unsuccessful in eliminating the impact of the execution 
risk on the homicide rate.
9 
Some researchers calculated the execution risk as the number of executions in a 
year divided by the number of prisoners in that state in that year (e.g. Katz et al. 2003).  
This calculation assumes that every prisoner in state correctional facilities is at risk of 
being executed.  This assumption has no validity as about 99.7 percent of the inmates in 
                                                 
9 Another extreme is to uniformly increase the lag length of the denominator.  For example, when lag-
length seven is imposed the same results are obtained, but not surprisingly, the statistically significance is 
lowered.  
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state prisons are incarcerated for non-capital offenses, and therefore they are not at risk of 
being executed, and there is no a priori reason to assume that the number of total 
prisoners is proportional to the number of death row inmates over time or across states.
10 
A more sensible way of calculating the risk of execution would be to use the ratio of 
executions to the number of inmates on death row, although as discussed before and 
displayed in Figure 10, a particular death row inmate in not at risk of dying if he just 
entered death row.  Nevertheless, deflating by death row is much more reasonable than 
deflating by total prisoners.  Results obtained from this exercise are reported in Table 8.  
Once again, executions have a negative impact on the murder rate in the state and 
commutations are positively related to homicide.  What happens if we insist on deflating 
executions, commutations and removals by the total number of prisoners?  The answer is 
provided in Table 9.  Although this inaccurate measure makes the impact of 
commutations disappear, it cannot make the impact of executions go away. 
Donohue III and Wolfers (2006, p. 815) promote two denominators to be used to 
deflate the number of executions.  They write “A very simple alternative that avoids this 
scaling issue is measuring executions per 100,000 residents.”   They also write: “Another 
alternative scaling –and perhaps the one most directly suggested by the economic model 
of crime—is to analyze the ratio of the number of executions to the (lagged) homicide 
rate.” (p. 815).
  Although it is evident that these suggested measures are very poor 
indicators of the relevant risks, we estimated the models with these denominators as well.  
The first panel of Table 10 displays the results when the number (count) of executions, 
commutations and removals are deflated by state population, and the second panel 
                                                 
10 For example, in 1997 there were a total of 1,127,686 inmates in state prisons, and there were 3,328 
death row inmates.  The number of total prisoners were 1,316,302 in 2004 and the number of people on 
death row was 3,314 in the same year.  
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presents the results when they are deflated by lagged homicide rate as suggested by D-
III&W. 
The dependent variable for the analysis is the homicide rate, which is measured as 
homicides deflated by population.  Thus, deflating executions by population, as suggested 
by D-III&W, means that population enters into the denominator of both the dependent 
and independent variables, inducing a positive bias in the estimated coefficient of the 
execution rate. Despite this, the coefficient of the execution rate remains negative and 
significant.   Because the dependent variable of the analysis is the homicide rate, to use 
the homicide rate as the deflator of executions is not meaningful.
11 Nevertheless, we used 
the lagged homicide rate as the deflator as promoted by D-II&W.  As the send panel of 
Table 10 demonstrates, even this trick did not make the results disappear. 
 
VI.  Further Attempts to Make the Results Disappear 
The risk measures employed in this paper and also used in Mocan and Gittings 
(2003) and D-III&W are calculated such that if there is an execution in a given state in a 
given year, but it so happens that nobody was sentenced to death five years prior, then the 
risk (EXECt/SENTt-5 ) cannot be calculated because the denominator is zero.  On the 
other hand, in cases where nobody was sentenced and nobody was executed, the 
execution risk was taken as zero. 
One can adopt an algorithm where observations are dropped from the data when 
the corresponding death sentences are zero, regardless of the numerator of the risk 
                                                 
11 Donohue III and Wolfers seem to recognize this, and write that in their analysis they 
employ the lagged homicide rate as the deflator (D-III&W, ft. 63).  However, if the 
homicide rate has any path-dependence, such as a simple AR(1) model, using the lagged-
dependent variable in the denominator of the independent variable does not avoid a bias.  
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measure.  This algorithm assumes that the risks cannot be calculated in cases when they 
should be zero, such as the cases where there is no legal death penalty.  Even so, and 
despite the fact that this algorithm eliminates about half of the legitimate observations, 
the impact of the death penalty on the homicide rate remains as shown in Tables 11A and 
11B.  Furthermore, although the irregular specification promoted by Donohue III and 
Wolfers, (which assumes that the duration from arrest-to-sentencing and from 
sentencing-to-execution, commutation or removal is less than one year) eliminates the 
statistical significance of the execution variables, it cannot eliminate the significance of 
commutations.  
What happens to the results if we go to the extreme and use the number of 
executions, commutations and removals as measures of risk, without deflating by 
anything?  Here, the scale of executions, commutations and removals are considered as 
appropriate signals to individuals, rather than the rates at which they occur (as defined by 
the correct denominator).  Though we do not agree that this is the correct specification, 
Table 12 shows that even this modification does not eliminate the impact of prices on 
human behavior.   Although the coefficients of commutations and removals are 
statistically insignificant, the coefficient of execution remains significant even in this 
model. 
D-III&W  argue that the deterrent impact of the death penalty which exists in 
states with large populations such as New York and New Jersey exert disproportionate 
influence in a population-weighted regression and overwhelms the no-deterrence result 
that would have been obtained in  regressions with no weighting. (Donohue III and 
Wolfers 2006, footnote 50).  To investigate if the results are driven by this hypothesis, we  
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estimated the models presented in Tables 1A and 1B without population weights.  The 
results are presented in Tables 13A and 13B.  In models where the duration of death row 
is taken as 5 years (the top panel), the results are actually stronger with the coefficients of 
the commutation rate being significant.  In the second panel of Tables 13A and 13B the 
execution rate is insignificant, but the removal rate becomes significant when it was 
insignificant in the weighted regression displayed in Tables 1A and 1B.  Finally, the 
results of the peculiar regression run by D-III&W remain unchanged whether the 
regressions are weighted or not.  Specifically, the bottom panels of Tables 13A and 13B 
show that, even in their model an increase in commutations generates an increase in the 
homicide rate as predicted by theory, and the coefficient of the removal rate becomes 
significant in one specification.   
In Table 14 we present the results obtained from the models that exclude New 
York and New Jersey, and estimate the models without weighting. As can be seen, the 
impact of leaving the death row on the homicide rate cannot be eliminated by dropping 
New York and New Jersey from the analysis and running the regressions with no 
weighting.  The same conclusion is obtained, when we ran the models displayed in 
Tables 2-6 with no weights.  Thus, the results are not an artifact of weighting. 
 
VII.  Ph.D. Economists versus Criminals 
In his Nobel lecture, Gary Becker described his inspiration for modeling 
economic behavior of crime as follows. 
“I began to think about crime in the 1960s after driving to 
Columbia University for an oral examination of a student in economic 
theory.  I was late and had to decide quickly whether to put the car in a 
parking lot or risk getting a ticket for parking illegally on the street.  I  
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calculated the likelihood of getting a ticket, the size of the penalty, and 
the cost of putting the car in a lot.  I decided it paid to take the risk and 
park on the street.  (I did not get a ticket.)   
As I walked the few blocks to the examination room, it occurred 
to me that the city authorities had probably gone through a similar 
analysis.  The frequency of their inspection of parked vehicles and the 
size of the penalty imposed on violators should depend on their 
estimates of the type of calculations potential violators like me would 
make.” (Becker 1992, p.42). 
 
 One standard objection to economic analysis of crime is that whether potential 
criminals are as astute as Ph.D. economists to evaluate these probabilities accurately.  
This objection is invalid so long as the researcher believes that empirical research should 
be conceptually consistent with the underlying theory.  If one assumes a priori that 
individuals are incapable of calculating the risks as they are defined by theory, then there 
is no room to conduct proper empirical research.  For example, if one rejects the 
theoretically-proper measure of the execution risk as executions within a cohort of death 
row inmates in a given year divided by death sentenced handed out to that cohort in some 
earlier year (because one believes that potential criminals do not observe either the 
executions or the death sentences), then one ought to claim that they cannot observe and 
evaluate other variables either, including the arrest rates, the size of the police force or 
police spending.  Thus, there would be no need to conduct research  investigating 
whether people react to deterrence, under the belief that people could not evaluate 
variations in deterrence risks to begin with.   
Furthermore, attempts to justify the use of inappropriate variables based on the 
claim that individuals cannot observe, measure or determine the values of decision 
parameters will produce peculiar analyses that cannot be defended theoretically.  For 
example, if the theory indicates that the real wages should matter in a particular context,  
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it would be silly to suggest the use of nominal wages in a regression (instead of real 
wages) on the grounds that people cannot observe and predict accurately the level of the 
consumer price index.  If the theory indicates that the accident risk in a state is best 
measured by the number of accidents per vehicle miles traveled, it would be incorrect to 
promote deflating accidents by other measures such as the square miles of the state or the 
number of car dealerships, on the grounds that vehicle miles traveled is difficult to 
observe. 
It should be noted, however, that in our context, the results are robust even to the 
use of measures that are inconsistent with theory.  A summary of the findings is provided 
in Table 15, which displays the results obtained from estimating various versions of 
Equation (1) along with the description of the measurement of the execution, 
commutation and removal rates in each specification.  The table displays results that are 
obtained from specifications where the key variables (execution, commutation and 
removal risks) are measured as dictated by theory.  The table also presents results from 
the models where they are measured incorrectly.  Examples are the specifications 
promoted by D-III&W (reported in rows 5 and 6 of Table 15), and the specifications 
where the executions, commutations and removals are deflated by lagged murder rate, by 
population, or where the raw count of executions, commutations and removals are used.  
As the table demonstrates, the results are remarkably stable even across models that 





VIII. Conclusion and Discussion 
  Do people respond to incentives?  An economist’s answer to this question is a 
resounding “yes,” not only because economic theory indicates that incentives matter, but 
because an enormous empirical literature shows that they do.  An especially confusing 
dimension for non-economists is the behavior of individuals in such domains as the 
consumption of addictive substances, sexual activity and criminal behavior.  In the case 
of criminal behavior, non-economists frequently express the belief that human beings are 
not rational enough to make calculated decisions about the costs and benefits of engaging 
in crime, and that criminal activity cannot be altered by incentives.  Of course personal 
beliefs should not determine the answers to scientific questions such as whether the earth 
is round or whether criminal behavior is responsive to incentives.  Rather, answers should 
be provided by careful and objective scientific inquiry.   
In the economic approach to crime, decades of empirical research has 
demonstrated that potential criminals indeed respond to incentives.  It has been 
documented that improved labor market conditions reduce the extent of criminal activity 
(recent examples include Grogger 1998, Freeman and Rodgers 2000, Gould et al. 2002), 
and criminal activity reacts to deterrence (e.g. Ehrlich 1975, Levitt 1998b, Kessler and 
Levitt 1998, Corman and Mocan 2000, Mustard 2003, Corman and Mocan 2005).  For 
example, Levitt (1998b) showed that deterrence is empirically more important than 
incapacitation in explaining crime, and that increases in arrest rates deter criminal 
activity.  Kessler and Levitt (1999) show that Proposition 8 in California, which 
introduced sentence enhancements for certain crimes, reduced eligible crimes by 4 
percent in the year following its passage and 8 percent 3 years after the passage,  
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providing strong evidence that crime rates react to the severity of punishment.  In an 
analysis of the relationship between crime and punishment for juveniles, Levitt (1998a) 
finds that changes in relative punishment between juveniles and adults explain 60 percent 
of the differential growth rates in juvenile and adult crime, and that abrupt changes in 
criminal involvement with the transition from juvenile to adult courts indicate that 
individuals do respond to the expected punishment (as economic theory suggests).  
Corman and Mocan (2005, 2000) show that criminal activity responds to variations in 
arrests and the size of the police force. 
As discussed in the introduction, the signal provided by leaving death row is no 
different from any other change in expected punishment.  That is, an execution is a signal 
of an increase in expected punishment, and a commutation represents a decrease in 
expected punishment.   However, it is sometimes claimed that because executions are 
infrequent events, they cannot possibly be a strong enough signals to alter the behavior of 
people.  Yet, the same analysts have no difficulty in believing that a prospective criminal 
observes correctly and accurately the extent of the increase in the number of arrests, and 
coupled with the information about the level of crime, he calculates the enhanced risk of 
getting caught, and changes his behavior.   Similarly, the suggestion that if the local 
authority hires 20 new police officers, the associated increase in the risk of getting caught 
by this move is properly evaluated by potential criminals does not raise objections.   Even 
prison deaths are believed to provide signals to people who are not in prison.  Katz, Levitt 
and Shustorovich (2003) find that the death rate in prisons constitutes deterrence, and an 
increase in prison deaths has a negative impact on crime rates.  It is very difficult to argue 
that an increase in prison deaths would be a signal of deterrence, but an increase in the  
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executions would not.  However, this is the argument put forth by some analysts (e.g. 
Donohue III and Wolfers 2006).   
Clearly, analysts’ personal beliefs regarding what should and should not 
constitute a strong signal are irrelevant.  Whether or not police, arrests, prison deaths, 
executions, or commutations provide signals to people about the extent of expected  
punishment is an empirical question.  In this paper we extend the analysis of Mocan and 
Gittings (2003).  We alter the original model in a number of directions to make the 
relationship between homicide rates and death penalty related outcomes (executions, 
commutations and removals) disappear.  We change the measurement of the risk 
variables by altering the numerator and the denominator of the variables in a variety of 
ways (see Table 15 for a summary), we also investigate how the results change when we 
exclude various states from the analysis.  The basic results are insensitive to these and a 
variety of other specification tests performed in the paper.   The impact of executions 
indeed becomes statistically insignificant when one estimates the specification promoted 
by Donohue III and Wolfers (2006).  However, that particular specification has little 
theoretical relevance as we have explained in detail, and, furthermore, even that 
specification cannot make the impact of commutations disappear. 
It is understandable that the death penalty may evoke strong feelings.  These 
feelings could be due to political, ideological, religious, or other personal beliefs.  The 
reactions towards the research that identifies a deterrent effect of the death penalty 
suggest that it may be difficult to isolate such feelings from objective evaluation of a 
research finding.  One reason may be the fear that a scientific paper which identifies a 
deterrent effect could be taken as an endorsement or justification of the death penalty.   
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This should not be the case for any scientific research.  This point is highlighted by 
Mocan and Gittings (2003) and Katz,Levitt and Shustorovich (2003).  For example, Katz, 
Levitt and Shustorovich (2003) find that the death rate among prisoners (a proxy for 
prison conditions) deters crime. This finding obviously does not suggest that the society 
should increase the death rate of the prisoners by worsening the prison conditions to 
reduce the crime rate. Nevertheless, the authors feel the need to state the obvious, and 
write that: 
 “We cannot stress enough that evidence of a deterrent effect of poor 
prison conditions is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for arguing 
that current prison conditions are either overly benign or unjustifiably 
inhumane.  Efficiency arguments related to deterrence are only one small aspect 
of an issue that is inextricably associated with basic human rights, 
constitutionality, and equity considerations.  Our research is descriptive, not 
proscriptive.” (p.322) 
   
Similarly, Mocan and Gittings (Mocan and Gittings 2003, p. 474) write that the 
fact that there exists a deterrent effect of capital punishment, should not imply a position 
on death penalty. There are a number of significant issues surrounding the death penalty, 
ranging from potential racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty 
(Baldus et al., 1998) to discrimination regarding who is executed and who is commuted 
once the death penalty is received (Argys and Mocan 2004).    
Although it is important to preserve objectivity in evaluating scientific research, 
because of the nature of death penalty, it seem like ideologues, activists, and some 
scientists also feel compelled to enter the debate with opinions formed based on selective 
readings and half-truths.  This unfortunate phenomenon is described succinctly by 
Sunstein and Vermeule (2006), where they write in their reply to D-III&W:  
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“We cannot help but add that as new entrants into the death penalty 
debate, we are struck by the intensity of people’s beliefs on the 
empirical issues, and the extent to which their empirical judgments 
seem to be driven by their moral commitments.  Those who oppose 
the death penalty on moral grounds often seem entirely unwilling 
to consider apparent evidence of deterrence and are happy to 
dismiss such evidence whenever even modest questions are raised 
about it.  Those who accept the death penalty on moral grounds 
often seem to accept the claim of deterrence whether or not good 
evidence has been provided on its behalf.” 
    
In summary, the original findings of Mocan and Gittings (2003) are robust, 
providing evidence that people react to incentives in the domain of capital punishment.  
Yet, this result does not imply that capital punishment is good or bad, nor does it provide 
any judgment about whether capital punishment should be implemented or abolished.  It 
is just a scientific finding which demonstrates that people react to incentives.  Therefore, 







Determinants of the Homicide Rate 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on death row: 5 years 
 (EXECt / SENTt-5 )-1 
-0.0056** 
(0.0027)     -0.0058**  
(0.0028) 
-0.0066**   
(0.0029) 
       
 (COMMt / SENTt-5 )-1    0.0065 
(0.0047)    0.0070 
(0.0046)   
       
 (REMOVEt / SENTt-5 )-1     0.0024*** 
(0.0008)    0.0027*** 
(0.0009) 
       
n  734 743 691 733 688 
Duration on death row: 4 years 
 (EXECt / SENTt-4 )-1 
-0.0054** 
(0.0022)     -0.0055**  
(0.0022) 
-0.0047**   
(0.0021) 
       
 (COMMt / SENTt-4 )-1    0.0036* 
(0.0021)    0.0038** 
(0.0019)   
       
 (REMOVEt / SENTt-4 )-1     0.0004 
(0.0007)    0.0005 
(0.0007) 
       
n  785 790 744 781 741 
 
Donohue III & Wolfers specification 
 
Duration on Death Row: 0 Years;  Time between Arrest and Death Sentence: 0 Years 
 
 (EXECt / SENTt  )-1 
0.0003 




       
 (COMMt / SENTt  )-1    0.0041*** 
(0.0013)    0.0041*** 
(0.0013)   
       
 
(REMOVEt / SENTt  )-1 
   0.0002 
(0.0003)    0.0002 
(0.0003) 
n  986 984 921 977 918 
Each model includes the following variables: The murder arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the 
unemployment rate, real per capita income, the proportion of the state population in the following age 
groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and over, the proportion of the state population in urban areas, the 
proportion which is black, the infant mortality rate, the legal drinking age in the state, the number of 
prisoners per violent crime, and the prison death rate.  Also included in each model are state fixed-effects, a 
time trend, state-specific time trends, a dummy variable to control for the impact of the 1995 Oklahoma 
City bombing, and a dummy variable to indicate is the governor is a Republican.  Robust and clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** 
statistical significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better.  
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Table 1B 
Determinants of the Homicide Rate 
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-5 )-1 
-0.0058*** 
(0.0020)     -0.0062***  
(0.0022) 
-0.0073***   
(0.0022) 
       
 (COMM2t / SENTt-5 )-1    0.0044 
(0.0047)    0.0056     
(0.0040)   
       
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-5 )-1     0.0018*** 
(0.0007)    0.0021*** 
(0.0007) 
       
n  737 743 712 736 709 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-4 )-1 
-0.0069* 
(0.0035)     -0.0070**  
(0.0035) 
-0.0063*   
(0.0033) 
       
 (COMM2t / SENTt-4 )-1    0.0034* 
(0.0019)    0.0036** 
(0.0016)   
       
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-4 )-1     0.0002 
(0.0008)    0.0005 
(0.0007) 
       
n  785 792 761 783 758 
Donohue III & Wolfers specification 
Duration on Death Row: Zero Years; Time Between Arrest and Death Sentence: 0 Years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt  )-1 
-0.0002 




       
 (COMM2t / SENTt  )-1    0.0039*** 
(0.0010)    0.0039*** 
(0.0001)   
       
 
(REMOVE2t / SENTt  )-1 
   -0.0002 
(0.0006)    -0.0002 
(0.0006) 
n  989 990 952 984 949 
Each model includes the following variables: The murder arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the 
unemployment rate, real per capita income, the proportion of the state population in the following age 
groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and over, the proportion of the state population in urban areas, the 
proportion which is black, the infant mortality rate, the legal drinking age in the state, the number of 
prisoners per violent crime, and the prison death rate.  Also included in each model are state fixed-effects, a 
time trend, state-specific time trends, a dummy variable to control for the impact of the 1995 Oklahoma 
City bombing, and a dummy variable to indicate is the governor is a Republican.  Robust and clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** 
statistical significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better.  
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Table 2A 
Determinants of the Homicide Rate (Excluding Texas) 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-5 )-1 
-0.0039** 
(0.0019)     -0.0040**  
(0.0019) 
-0.0049**   
(0.0021) 
        
(COMMt / SENTt-5 )-1    0.0045 
(0.0047)    0.0048     
(0.0046)   
(REMOVEt / SENTt-5 )-1     0.0022*** 
(0.0008)    0.0025*** 
(0.0009) 
n  719 728  676  718  673 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years  
(EXECt / SENTt-4 )-1 
-0.0044** 
(0.0021)     -0.0045**  
(0.0021) 
-0.0037*   
(0.0020) 
        
(COMMt / SENTt-4 )-1    0.0040*** 
(0.0015)    0.0040***    
(0.0014)   
(REMOVEt / SENTt-4 )-1     0.0004  
(0.0007)    0.0045 
(0.0007) 
n  769 774  728  765  725 
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 




   -0.0052***  
(0.0017) 
-0.0061***   
(0.0020) 
        
 (COMM2t / SENTt-4 )-1    0.0037 
(0.0043)    0.0048     
(0.0035)   
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-4 )-1     0.0017*** 
(0.0006)    0.0020*** 
(0.0007) 
n  722 728  697  721  694 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-4 )-1 
-0.0061 
(0.0037)     -0.0062  
(0.0037) 
-0.0053   
(0.0034) 
        
 (COMM2t / SENTt-4 )-1    0.0037*** 
(0.0013)    0.0040***    
(0.0012)   
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-4 )-1     0.0002  
(0.0007)    0.0043 
(0.0007) 
n  769 776  745  767  742 
Each model includes the following variables: The murder arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the unemployment rate, real 
per capita income, the proportion of the state population in the following age groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and 
over, the proportion of the state population in urban areas, the proportion which is black, the infant mortality rate, the 
legal drinking age in the state, the number of prisoners per violent crime, and the prison death rate.  Also included in 
each model are state fixed-effects, a time trend, state-specific time trends,  a dummy variable to control for the impact 
of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and a dummy variable to indicate is the governor is a Republican.  Robust and 
clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical 
significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better.  
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Table 2B 
Determinants of the Homicide Rate (Excluding California) 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-5 )-1 
-0.0048* 




       
(COMMt / SENTt-5 )-1    0.0050 
(0.0047)    0.0054 
(0.0046)   
       
(REMOVEt / SENTt-5 )-1     0.0024*** 
(0.0008)    0.0027*** 
(0.0009) 
       
n  719 728 677 718 674 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
 (EXECt / SENTt-4 )-1 
-0.0052** 




       
(COMMt / SENTt-4 )-1    0.0034 
(0.0022)    0.0036* 
(0.0020)   
       
(REMOVEt / SENTt-4 )-1     0.0006 
(0.0007)    0.0008 
(0.0007) 
       
n  769 774 729 765 726 
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-5 )-1 
-0.0049** 




       
 (COMM2t / SENTt-5 )-1    0.0031 
(0.0047)    0.0041 
(0.0040)   
       
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-5 )-1     0.0018*** 
(0.0006)    0.0021*** 
(0.0007) 
       
n  722 728 697 721 694 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-4 )-1 
-0.0063* 




       
 (COMM2t / SENTt-4 )-1    0.0032 
(0.0020)    0.0033* 
(0.0018)   
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-4 )-1     0.0003 
(0.0008)    0.0006 
(0.0008) 
       
n  769 776 746 767 743 
Each model includes the following variables: The murder arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the unemployment rate, real 
per capita income, the proportion of the state population in the following age groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and 
over, the proportion of the state population in urban areas, the proportion which is black, the infant mortality rate, the 
legal drinking age in the state, the number of prisoners per violent crime, and the prison death rate.  Also included in 
each model are state fixed-effects, a time trend, state-specific time trends,  a dummy variable to control for the impact 
of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and a dummy variable to indicate is the governor is a Republican.  Robust and 
clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical 
significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better.  
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Table 2C 
Determinants of the Homicide Rate (Excluding Texas and California) 
The First Measure of Executions, Commutations, and Removals 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-5 )-1 
-0.0029 
(0.0019)     -0.0030**  
(0.0020) 
-0.0041*   
(0.0023) 
       
(COMMt / SENTt-5 )-1    0.0048 
(0.0043)    0.0051     
(0.0042)   
(REMOVEt / SENTt-5 )-1     0.0024*** 
(0.0008)    0.0026*** 
(0.0009) 
n  704 713 662 703 659 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-4 )-1 
-0.0041** 
(0.0019)     -0.0042**  
(0.0019) 
-0.0036*   
(0.0018) 
       
(COMMt / SENTt-4 )-1    0.0042*** 
(0.0011)    0.0043**     
(0.0019)   
(REMOVEt / SENTt-4 )-1     0.0007  
(0.0007)    0.0008 
(0.0007) 
n  753 758 713 749 710 
The Second Measure of Executions, Commutations, and Removals 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-4 )-1 
-0.0039** 
(0.0016)     -0.0042**  
(0.0017) 
-0.0054***   
(0.0019) 
       
 (COMM2t / SENTt-4 )-1    0.0037 
(0.0040)    0.0046     
(0.0034)   
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-4 )-1     0.0018*** 
(0.0006)    0.0020*** 
(0.0007) 
n  707 713 682 706 679 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-4 )-1 
-0.0055 
(0.0034)     -0.0056*  
(0.0033) 
-0.0051   
(0.0031) 
       
 (COMM2t / SENTt-4 )-1    0.0039*** 
(0.0011)    0.0040***    
(0.0010)   
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-4 )-1     0.0004  
(0.0008)    0.0006 
(0.0007) 
n  753 760 730 751 727 
Each model includes the following variables: The murder arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the unemployment rate, real 
per capita income, the proportion of the state population in the following age groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and 
over, the proportion of the state population in urban areas, the proportion which is black, the infant mortality rate, the 
legal drinking age in the state, the number of prisoners per violent crime, and the prison death rate.  Also included in 
each model are state fixed-effects, a time trend, state-specific time trends,  a dummy variable to control for the impact 
of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and a dummy variable to indicate is the governor is a Republican.  Robust and 
clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical 




Execution Risk by State 
 
 
PRISON is the total number of prisoners in the state. ROW is the number of death row inmates. 
 
 
  Number of Exits from Death Row  Execution Risk  Execution Risk Ranking 








































Alabama 16  1  130  0.116 0.099 0.072  0.009  8  8  7  8 
Arkansas 16  1  46  0.49  0.327 0.157  0.031  2  2  3  3 
Georgia 22  6  150  0.136  0.127  0.057 0.012  7  7  8  7 
Louisiana 24  2  78  0.345  0.315 0.226  0.056  3  3  1  2 
Missouri 29  1  30  0.301 0.245 0.114  0.023  5  6  5  5 
Nevada 6  3  32  0.079  0.08  0.072  0.007  10  9  6  9 
Oklahoma 9  1  95  0.082  0.074 0.053  0.005  9  10  9  12 
South 
Carolina 
13 3  49  0.28  0.31  0.05  0.014  6  4  10  6 
Texas  144  44 166  0.307  0.304  0.135  0.026  4 5 4  4 
Virginia 46  5  15  0.612  0.652  0.162  0.059  1  1  2  1  
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Table 4A 
Determinants of the Homicide Rate (Excluding Virginia) 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-5 )-1 
-0.0066* 




       
(COMMt / SENTt-5 )-1)    0.0087** 
(0.0038)    0.0091** 
(0.0039)   
       
(REMOVEt / SENTt-5 )-1     0.0025*** 
(0.0008)    0.0029*** 
(0.0010) 
       
n  719 728 676 718 673 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-4 )-1 
-0.0052** 




       
(COMMt / SENTt-4 )-1    0.0044*** 
(0.0016)    0.0045*** 
(0.0015)   
       
(REMOVEt / SENTt-4 )-1     0.0004 
(0.0007)    0.0005 
(0.0007) 
       
n  769 774 728 765 725 
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-5 )-1 
-0.0063** 




       
 (COMM2t / SENTt-5 )-1    0.0083*** 
(0.0030)    0.0083*** 
(0.0031)   
       
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-5 )-1     0.0019*** 
(0.0007)    0.0023*** 
(0.0008) 
       
n  722 728 697 721 694 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-4 )-1 
-0.0066 




       
 (COMM2t / SENTt-4 )-1    0.0043*** 
(0.0013)    0.0044*** 
(0.0012)   
       
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-4 )-1     0.0003 
(0.0008)    0.0005 
(0.0007) 
n  769 776 745 767 742 
Each model includes the following variables: The murder arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the unemployment rate, real 
per capita income, the proportion of the state population in the following age groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and 
over, the proportion of the state population in urban areas, the proportion which is black, the infant mortality rate, the 
legal drinking age in the state, the number of prisoners per violent crime, and the prison death rate.  Also included in 
each model are state fixed-effects, a time trend, state-specific time trends,  a dummy variable to control for the impact 
of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and a dummy variable to indicate is the governor is a Republican.  Robust and 
clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical 
significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better.  
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Table 4B 
Determinants of the Homicide Rate (Excluding Arkansas) 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-5 )-1 
-0.0055* 




          
(COMMt / SENTt-5 )-1    0.0065 
(0.0047)    0.0068 
(0.0046)   
          
(REMOVEt / SENTt-5 )-1     0.0023*** 
(0.0008)    0.0026*** 
(0.0009) 
          
n  719  728 676 718 673 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-4 )-1 
-0.0053 




          
(COMMt / SENTt-4 )-1    0.0036* 
(0.0021)    0.0038** 
(0.0019)   
          
(REMOVEt / SENTt-4 )-1     0.0004 
(0.0008)    0.0005 
(0.0008) 
          
n  769  774 728 765 725 
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-5 )-1 
-0.0058*** 




          
 (COMM2t / SENTt-5 )-1    0.0044 
(0.0047)    0.0057 
(0.0040)   
          
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-5 )-1     0.0017** 
(0.0007)    0.0021*** 
(0.0007) 
          
n  722  728 697 721 694 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-4 )-1 
-0.0064 




          
 (COMM2t / SENTt-4 )-1    0.0034* 
(0.0019)    0.0036** 
(0.0016)   
          
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-4 )-1     0.0002 
(0.0008)    0.0005 
(0.0008) 
n  769  776 745 767 742 
Each model includes the following variables: The murder arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the unemployment rate, real 
per capita income, the proportion of the state population in the following age groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and 
over, the proportion of the state population in urban areas, the proportion which is black, the infant mortality rate, the 
legal drinking age in the state, the number of prisoners per violent crime, and the prison death rate.  Also included in 
each model are state fixed-effects, a time trend, state-specific time trends,  a dummy variable to control for the impact 
of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and a dummy variable to indicate is the governor is a Republican.  Robust and 
clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical 
significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better.  
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Table 4C 
Determinants of the Homicide Rate (Excluding Louisiana) 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-5 )-1 
-0.0059 




        
(COMMt / SENTt-5 )-1    0.0080* 
(0.0041)    0.0086** 
(0.0041)   
        
(REMOVEt / SENTt-5 )-1     0.0022** 
(0.0009)    0.0024** 
(0.0009) 
        
n  720  728 678 719 675 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-4 )-1 
-0.0041* 




        
(COMMt / SENTt-4 )-1    0.0041*** 
(0.0015)    0.0042*** 
(0.0014)   
        
(REMOVEt / SENTt-4 )-1     0.0006 
(0.0007)    0.0008 
(0.0007) 
        
n  770  774 730 766 727 
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-5 )-1 
-0.0060** 




        
 (COMM2t / SENTt-5 )-1    0.0058 
(0.0043)    0.0072** 
(0.0034)   
        
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-5 )-
1 
   0.0017** 
(0.0008)    0.0018** 
(0.0008) 
        
n  722  728 699 721 696 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt-4 )-1 
-0.0039 




        
 (COMM2t / SENTt-4 )-1    0.0039*** 
(0.0014)    0.0040*** 
(0.0013)   
        
 (REMOVE2t / SENTt-4 )-
1 
   0.0005 
(0.0007)    0.0006 
(0.0007) 
n  770  776 747 768 744 
Each model includes the following variables: The murder arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the unemployment rate, real 
per capita income, the proportion of the state population in the following age groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and 
over, the proportion of the state population in urban areas, the proportion which is black, the infant mortality rate, the 
legal drinking age in the state, the number of prisoners per violent crime, and the prison death rate.  Also included in 
each model are state fixed-effects, a time trend, state-specific time trends,  a dummy variable to control for the impact 
of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and a dummy variable to indicate is the governor is a Republican.  Robust and 
clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical 





The Impact of the Death Penalty on the Homicide Rate 
Kansas 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
-0.0214 -0.0044  -0.0007  -0.008*  -0.0011  Death Penalty Legal (-1)  (0.0220) (0.0183)  (0.0061)  (0.0040)  (0.0033) 
          
0.0296 0.0112    0.0293**  0.0275*  Homicide Arrest Rate (-1)  (0.0225) (0.0109)    (0.0105)  (0.0146) 
          
-0.003 -0.0441    -0.08***  -0.0856**  Prisoners per Violent Crime (-1)  (0.0675) (0.0498)    (0.0160)  (0.0210) 
          
-0.0116 -0.0091    0.0059*    Prison Death Rate (-1)  (0.0063) (0.0057)    (0.0031)   
          
0.0066 0.0041  0.0019      Percent Black  (0.0041) (0.0042)  (0.0015)     
          
-0.0098* -0.0098**  -0.015**      Republican Governor  (0.0031) (0.0023)  (0.0045)     
          
Unemployment Rate  -0.0019        
  (0.0021)        
          
-0.0338 -0.0287* -0.0253** -0.0073    Per Capita Income  (0.0134) (0.0126)  (0.0065)  (0.0061)   
          
Infant Mortality Rate  0.0005        
  (0.0043)        
          
Urbanization  0.0499        
  (0.0667)        
          
Percent Aged 20 - 34  -0.04 -0.0457**  -0.0268**     
  (0.0145) (0.0103)  (0.0069)     
          
Percent Aged 35 - 44  -0.0608 -0.055** -0.0244**     
  (0.0274) (0.0171)  (0.0085)     
          
 Percent Aged 45 - 54  -0.0245 -0.0365** -0.0177**     
  (0.0195) (0.0100)  (0.0067)     
          
Percent Aged 55+  0.013* 0.0097** 0.0074**     
  (0.0039) (0.0016)  (0.0027)     
          
0.0076 0.0159** 0.0072** 0.0026**  0.0014***  Time Trend 
  (0.0106) (0.0054)  (0.0029)  (0.0008)  (0.0003) 
Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.  * statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, 





The Impact of the Death Penalty on the Homicide Rate 
New Hampshire 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
-0.0226 -0.0253**  -0.0125  -0.0206**  -0.0213**  Death Penalty Legal (-1)  (0.0119) (0.0099)  (0.0105)  (0.0080)  (0.0078) 
          
-0.0051  0.0005  0.0013  0.0004  Homicide Arrest Rate (-1)  (0.0038) (0.0027)    (0.0023)  (0.0019) 
          
0.0412  0.0566  0.0182  0.0168  Prisoners per Violent Crime (-1)  (0.0377) (0.0304)    (0.0161)  (0.0140) 
          
0.0004  0.0006  0.0005   Prison Death Rate (-1)  (0.0013) (0.0011)    (0.0007)   
          
-0.001 0.0013  0.0022      Percent Black  (0.0053) (0.0025)  (0.0042)     
          
-0.01 -0.0046 -0.0011      Republican Governor  (0.0063) (0.0042)  (0.0049)     
          
Unemployment Rate  0.0013        
  (0.0033)        
          
0.0069 0.0033 -0.0007 0.0001    Per Capita Income  (0.0108) (0.0037)  (0.0039)  (0.0026)   
          
Infant Mortality Rate  -0.0046        
  (0.0030)        
          
Urbanization  -0.0796        
  (0.0423)        
          
Percent Aged 20 - 34  -0.0031 0.0091  0.0029     
  (0.0120) (0.0083)  (0.0104)     
          
Percent Aged 35 - 44  0.0032 -0.017 -0.0102     
  (0.0166) (0.0103)  (0.0112)     
          
 Percent Aged 45 - 54  0.0053 -0.0006  -0.003     
  (0.0220) (0.0138)  (0.0176)     
          
Percent Aged 55+  -0.0079 -0.0027  -0.0032     
  (0.0069) (0.0046)  (0.0038)     
          
-0.0183 0.0055  0.006  -0.0003 -0.0001  Time Trend 
  (0.0142) (0.0047)  (0.0050)  (0.0017)  (0.0008) 
Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.  * statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, 









The Impact of the Death Penalty on the Homicide Rate 
Massachusetts  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
-0.0055 -0.0059 -0.0082* -0.0075 -0.0066  Death Penalty Legal (-1)  (0.0060) (0.0048)  (0.0045)  (0.0065)  (0.0051) 
          
0.0028 0.0017    -0.0022 -0.002  Homicide Arrest Rate (-1)  (0.0103) (0.0061)    (0.0062)  (0.0047) 
          
-0.0932  -0.1127  -0.1152  -0.1253  Prisoners per Violent Crime (-1)  (0.1731) (0.1374)    (0.1178)  (0.0762) 
          
0.0012 0.0008    -0.0001    Prison Death Rate (-1)  (0.0044) (0.0021)    (0.0012)   
          
-0.0022 -0.0021  -0.0015      Percent Black  (0.0046) (0.0019)  (0.0017)     
          
-0.0069 -0.0058  -0.0043      Republican Governor  (0.0133) (0.0098)  (0.0084)     
          
Unemployment Rate  0.0004        
  (0.0026)        
          
-0.0149 -0.0151 -0.0159** -0.0005    Per Capita Income  (0.0203) (0.0088)  (0.0071)  (0.0034)   
          
Infant Mortality Rate  0.00003        
  (0.0073)        
          
Urbanization  -0.0287        
  (0.1967)        
          
Percent Aged 20 - 34  0.0124 0.0127* 0.0152**     
  (0.0145) (0.0063)  (0.0059)     
          
Percent Aged 35 - 44  0.0384 0.0358  0.0299     
  (0.0522) (0.0205)  (0.0190)     
          
 Percent Aged 45 - 54  0.0309 0.0309 0.0324*     
  (0.0371) (0.0177)  (0.0167)     
          
Percent Aged 55+  -0.0051 -0.0041  -0.0045     
  (0.0144) (0.0025)  (0.0027)     
          
-0.0078 -0.0079  -0.0068  0.0003  0.0003  Time Trend 
  (0.0098) (0.0061)  (0.0057)  (0.0006)  (0.0006) 
Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.  * statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, 







The Impact of the Death Penalty on the Homicide Rate 
Rhode Island 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
-0.0087 -0.0051  -0.0043  -0.0034  -0.0063  Death Penalty Legal (-1)  (0.0046) (0.0096)  (0.0070)  (0.0076)  (0.0067) 
          
0.0264  -0.0025  -0.0142  -0.0135  Homicide Arrest Rate (-1)  (0.0155) (0.0222)    (0.0131)  (0.0105) 
          
0.0851 0.0235    -0.0089 -0.0086  Prisoners per Violent Crime (-1)  (0.0409) (0.0559)    (0.0291)  (0.0257) 
          
0.0089** 0.0001    -0.0009    Prison Death Rate (-1)  (0.0032) (0.0033)    (0.0017)   
          
0.0007 0.0011  0.0009      Percent Black  (0.0021) (0.0029)  (0.0021)     
          
-0.0124* -0.0057  -0.0048      Republican Governor  (0.0056) (0.0074)  (0.0055)     
          
Unemployment Rate  0.0008        
  (0.0014)        
          
0.0138 0.0057  0.0065  0.0027    Per Capita Income  (0.0067) (0.0076)  (0.0055)  (0.0038)   
          
Infant Mortality Rate  -0.005**        
  (0.0015)        
          
Urbanization  -0.0985        
  (0.0759)        
          
Percent Aged 20 - 34  0.0084 0.0129  0.0136     
  (0.0092) (0.0165)  (0.0125)     
          
Percent Aged 35 - 44  -0.0818* -0.007  -0.0031     
  (0.0303) (0.0354)  (0.0190)     
          
 Percent Aged 45 - 54  -0.0177 0.0161  0.0199     
  (0.0242) (0.0339)  (0.0243)     
          
Percent Aged 55+  -0.0155 0.0042  0.0053     
  (0.0103) (0.0146)  (0.0099)     
          
0.0139 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0013 -0.0008  Time Trend 
  (0.0100) (0.0129)  (0.0071)  (0.0013)  (0.0011) 
Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.  * statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, 







TABLE 5E  
The Impact of the Death Penalty on the Homicide Rate 
New York 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
0.0087 0.0165  0.0113  0.0119  0.0145  Death Penalty Legal (-1)  (0.0183) (0.0122)  (0.0125)  (0.0108)  (0.0194) 
          
-0.0454  -0.0003  -0.0163  -0.0139  Homicide Arrest Rate (-1)  (0.0836) (0.0345)    (0.0377)  (0.0341) 
          
-0.0514 -0.3344    -0.4935***  -0.4907**  Prisoners per Violent Crime (-1)  (0.5724) (0.2532)    (0.0799)  (0.1214) 
          
-0.0043 -0.0065*    -0.0076*    Prison Death Rate (-1)  (0.0035) (0.0029)    (0.0037)   
          
-0.0041 -0.0053  -0.0049      Percent Black  (0.0088) (0.0040)  (0.0034)     
          
-0.0015 -0.0006  -0.0094      Republican Governor  (0.0220) (0.0126)  (0.0156)     
          
Unemployment Rate  0.0028        
  (0.0031)        
          
-0.0142 -0.0176 -0.0409*  0.0132**    Per Capita Income  (0.0280) (0.0257)  (0.0185)  (0.0050)   
          
Infant Mortality Rate  0.0055        
  (0.0143)        
          
Urbanization  -0.2638        
  (0.4182)        
          
Percent Aged 20 - 34  0.0689 0.0746 0.1102**     
  (0.0577) (0.0409)  (0.0264)     
          
Percent Aged 35 - 44  0.05 0.0449 0.0524     
  (0.0388) (0.0304)  (0.0378)     
          
 Percent Aged 45 - 54  0.1108 0.12** 0.1581**     
  (0.0549) (0.0467)  (0.0402)     
          
Percent Aged 55+  -0.0116 -0.0063 -0.0134**     
  (0.0283) (0.0099)  (0.0049)     
          
-0.0151 -0.0015  -0.0021  0.005** 0.0071**  Time Trend 
  (0.0178) (0.0061)  (0.0069)  (0.0015)  (0.0017) 
Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.  * statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, 









The Impact of the Death Penalty on the Homicide Rate 
New Jersey 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
-0.0101 -0.009*  -0.0085***  -0.0132**  -0.0132**  Death Penalty Legal (-1)  (0.0140) (0.0037)  (0.0017)  (0.0036)  (0.0030) 
          
-0.0281  -0.0217  -0.0151  -0.0191*  Homicide Arrest Rate (-1)  (0.0479) (0.0334)    (0.0119)  (0.0095) 
          
0.0028  -0.0361  -0.1273  -0.1135  Sentencing Rate  (0.6044) (0.2605)    (0.1565)  (0.1388) 
          
0.0617 0.0694    -0.0403 -0.0357  Prisoners per Violent Crime (-1)  (0.2990) (0.1368)    (0.0511)  (0.0366) 
          
-0.0005 -0.00004    0.0005    Prison Death Rate (-1)  (0.0017) (0.0007)    (0.0009)   
          
0.0054 0.0031 0.0021**      Percent Black  (0.0054) (0.0024)  (0.0008)     
          
-0.0002 0.0012  0.0008      Republican Governor  (0.0081) (0.0041)  (0.0027)     
          
Unemployment Rate  0.0007        
  (0.0052)        
          
0.0034 -0.0047  -0.0041** 0.0001    Per Capita Income  (0.0260) (0.0081)  (0.0018)  (0.0018)   
          
Infant Mortality Rate  0.0007        
  (0.0054)        
          
Urbanization  0.2388        
  (0.3706)        
          
Percent Aged 20 - 34  -0.0155 0.0006  0.0056     
  (0.0413) (0.0146)  (0.0043)     
          
Percent Aged 35 - 44  -0.0477 -0.032* -0.0278**     
  (0.0393) (0.0148)  (0.0067)     
          
 Percent Aged 45 - 54  -0.0374 -0.0145  -0.0017     
  (0.0682) (0.0274)  (0.0086)     
          
Percent Aged 55+  -0.0102 -0.0111  0.0001     
  (0.0455) (0.0159)  (0.0013)     
          
0.0031 0.01* 0.0099**  0.0003 0.0004  Time Trend 
  (0.0134) (0.0041)  (0.0024)  (0.0008)  (0.0008) 
Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.  * statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, 





Determinants of the Homicide Rate  
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 





















         











         











         











          
Death Penalty Legal (-1) x 










          




(0.0019)    0.0067 
(0.0046)   
          
Death Penalty Legal (-1) x 
Removal Rate (-1) 
    0.0005 
(0.0007)    0.0028*** 
(0.0009) 
          
n  894 781 741  733  688 
The column headings SENTt-4 and SENTt-5 mean that execution, commutation and removal rates are 
calculated by deflating EXECt, COMMt and REMOVEt by SENTt-4 or SENTt-5.  Each model includes the 
following variables: The murder arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the unemployment rate, real per capita 
income, the proportion of the state population in the following age groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and 
over, the proportion of the state population in urban areas, the proportion which is black, the infant 
mortality rate, the legal drinking age in the state, the number of prisoners per violent crime, and the prison 
death rate.  Also included in each model are state fixed-effects, a time trend, state-specific time trends, a 
dummy variable to control for the impact of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and a dummy variable to 
indicate is the governor is a Republican.  Robust and clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * 
indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical significance between 5 and 1 
percent. *** statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better.  
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Table 6B 
Determinants of the Homicide Rate  








(4)   
SENTt-5 
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SENTt-5 











          











          











          












          
Death Penalty Legal (-1) x 
Execution Rate (-1) 








          
Death Penalty Legal (-1) x 
Commutation Rate(-1) 
  0.0036** 
(0.0016)    0.0054 
(0.0040)   
          
Death Penalty Legal (-1) x 
REMOVE Rate (-1) 
 
  0.0005 
(0.0007)    0.0022*** 
(0.0007) 
          
n  894  783 758  736  709 
The column headings SENTt-4 and SENTt-5 mean that execution, commutation and removal rates are 
calculated by deflating EXECt, COMMt and REMOVEt by SENTt-4 or SENTt-5. Each model includes the 
following variables: The murder arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the unemployment rate, real per capita 
income, the proportion of the state population in the following age groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and 
over, the proportion of the state population in urban areas, the proportion which is black, the infant 
mortality rate, the legal drinking age in the state, the number of prisoners per violent crime, and the prison 
death rate.  Also included in each model are state fixed-effects, a time trend, state-specific time trends, a 
dummy variable to control for the impact of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and a dummy variable to 
indicate is the governor is a Republican.  Robust and clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * 
indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical significance between 5 and 1 











Determinants of the Homicide Rate 
With Time Varying Lags 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
         
(EXECt / SENTt-i) -1 
-0.0058* 




         
(COMMt /SENTt-j) -1    0.0014 
(0.0064)    0.0009 
(0.0067)   
         
(REMOVEt/SENTt-k) -1     0.0003 
(0.0008)    0.0001 
(0.0008) 
         
n  830 642 784  629  773 
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
         
(EXEC2t / SENTt-i) -1 
-0.0049* 




         
(COMM2t /SENTt-j) -1    0.0009 
(0.0054)    0.0004 
(0.0059)   
         
(REMOVE2t/SENTt-k) -1     0.0007 
(0.0007)    0.0006 
(0.0007) 
         
n  833 643 806  632  797 
Each model includes the following variables: The murder arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the 
unemployment rate, real per capita income, the proportion of the state population in the following age 
groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and over, the proportion of the state population in urban areas, the 
proportion which is black, the infant mortality rate, the legal drinking age in the state, the number of 
prisoners per violent crime, and the prison death rate.  Also included in each model are state fixed-effects, a 
time trend, state-specific time trends, a dummy variable to control for the impact of the 1995 Oklahoma 
City bombing, and a dummy variable to indicate is the governor is a Republican.  Robust and clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** 
statistical significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better.  
i, j and k are average durations on death row for spells ending in year t for executions, commutations and 
removals, respectively.  
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Table 8 
Determinants of the Homicide Rate 
 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
deflated by Death Row Inmates 
(EXECt / ROWt) -1 
-0.0465* 




         
(COMMt / ROWt) -1    0.0098*** 
(0.0014)    0.0097*** 
(0.0015)   
         
(REMOVEt / ROWt) -1     -0.0026 
(0.0062)    -0.0021 
(0.0062) 
         
n  894 894 890  894  890 
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
deflated by Death Row Inmates 
(EXEC2t / ROWt) -1 
-0.0501* 




         
(COMM2t / ROWt) -1    0.0084*** 
(0.0017)    0.0083*** 
(0.0017)   
         
(REMOVE2t /ROWt) -1     -0.0043 
(0.0051)    -0.0039 
(0.0052) 
         
n  894 894 893  894  893 
         
 
ROW stands for the number of death raw inmates. Each model includes the following variables: The 
murder arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the unemployment rate, real per capita income, the proportion of the 
state population in the following age groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and over, the proportion of the 
state population in urban areas, the proportion which is black, the infant mortality rate, the legal drinking 
age in the state, the number of prisoners per violent crime, and the prison death rate.  Also included in each 
model are state fixed-effects, a time trend, state-specific time trends, a dummy variable to control for the 
impact of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and a dummy variable to indicate is the governor is a 
Republican.  Robust and clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance 
between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** statistical significance at 
the 1 percent level or better.  
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Table 9 
Determinants of the Homicide Rate 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
deflated Total Prisoners/1,000 
(EXECt / PRISt) -1 
-0.0258** 
(0.0101)     -0.0255** 
(0.0102) 
-0.0257 **  
(0.0101) 
       
(COMMt / PRISt) -1    0.0085 
(0.0077)    0.0075 
(0.0083)   
       
(REMOVEt / PRISt) -1     0.0007 
(0.0008)    0.0006 
(0.0008) 
       
n  894 894 894 894 894 
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
deflated by Total Prisoners/1,000 
(EXEC2t / PRISt) -1 
-0.0208** 




       
(COMM2t / PRISt) -1    0.0065 
(0.0067)    0.0056 
(0.0073)   
       
(REMOVE2t / PRISt) -1     0.0003 
(0.0007)    0.0028 
(0.0007) 
       
n  894 894 894 894 894 
PRIS stands for the number of total prisoners. Each model includes the following variables: The murder 
arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the unemployment rate, real per capita income, the proportion of the state 
population in the following age groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and over, the proportion of the state 
population in urban areas, the proportion which is black, the infant mortality rate, the legal drinking age in 
the state, the number of prisoners per violent crime, and the prison death rate.  Also included in each model 
are state fixed-effects, a time trend, state-specific time trends, a dummy variable to control for the impact of 
the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and a dummy variable to indicate is the governor is a Republican.  
Robust and clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 
5 percent, ** statistical significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** statistical significance at the 1 percent 

















Determinants of the Homicide Rate 
The Raw Count of Executions, Commutations, and Removals 
Deflated by Population/100,000 
( #EXt / POPt )-1 
-0.055* 
(0.0281)     -0.0055*  
(0.028) 
-0.0051*   
(0.0028) 
       
( #Ct / POPt )-1    0.0099 
(0.0212)    0.0011 
(0.020)   
       
( #Rt / POPt )-1     0.0037 
(0.0061)    0.0037 
(0.0063) 
       
n  894 894 894 894 894 
The Raw Count of Executions, Commutations, and Removals 
Deflated by Lagged Murder Rate x 1000 
( #EXt / MURDERt-1 )-1 
-0.0543** 
(0.0251)     -0.0542**  
(0.0022) 
-0.0543**   
(0.0021) 
       
( #Ct / MURDERt-1  )-1    -0.0120 
(0.0254)    -0.0098 
(0.0252)   
       
( #Rt / MURDERt-1 )-1     -0.0004 
(0.0122)    0.0001 
(0.0127) 
       
n  894 894 894 894 894 
#EXt denotes the raw counts of executions. #Ct denotes the raw counts of commutations, and #Rt  stands for 
the raw counts of death row removals. POP is the population in the state. MURDER is the homicide rate. 
Each model includes the following variables: The murder arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the 
unemployment rate, real per capita income, the proportion of the state population in the following age 
groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and over, the proportion of the state population in urban areas, the 
proportion which is black, the infant mortality rate, the legal drinking age in the state, the number of 
prisoners per violent crime, and the prison death rate.  Also included in each model are state fixed-effects, a 
time trend, state-specific time trends, a dummy variable to control for the impact of the 1995 Oklahoma 
City bombing, and a dummy variable to indicate is the governor is a Republican.  Robust and clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** 




Determinants of the Homicide Rate  
Dropping Observations where Risk=0 and Denominator=0 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on death row: 5 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-5) -1 
-0.0043 
(0.0027)     -0.0045‡  
(0.0029) 
-0.0061**   
(0.0026) 
       
(COMMt /SENTt-5) -1    0.0057 
(0.0050)    0.0061 
(0.0050)   
       
(REMOVEt/SENTt-5) -1     0.0022** 
(0.0008)    0.0025*** 
(0.0009) 
       
n  398 398 398 398 398 
Duration on death row: 4 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-4) -1 
-0.0053** 
(0.0022)     -0.0053* 
(0.0022) 
-0.0054**   
(0.0021) 
       
(COMMt /SENTt-4) -1    0.0018 
(0.0025)    0.0019 
(0.0023)   
       
(REMOVEt/SENTt-4) -1     0.0002 
(0.0006)    0.0003 
(0.0006) 
       
n  426 426 426 426 426 
 
Donohue III & Wolfers Specification 
Duration on Death Row: 0 Years; Time between Arrest and Death Sentence: 0 Years 
 
 (EXECt / SENTt  )-1 
0.0000 




       
 (COMMt / SENTt  )-1    0.0034* 
(0.0019)    0.0034* 
(0.0013)   
       
 
(REMOVEt / SENTt  )-1 
   0.0004 
(0.0003)    0.0004 
(0.0003) 
n  543 543 543 543 543 
Each model includes the following variables: The murder arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the 
unemployment rate, real per capita income, the proportion of the state population in the following age 
groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and over, the proportion of the state population in urban areas, the 
proportion which is black, the infant mortality rate, the legal drinking age in the state, the number of 
prisoners per violent crime, and the prison death rate.  Also included in each model are state fixed-effects, a 
time trend, state-specific time trends, a dummy variable to control for the impact of the 1995 Oklahoma 
City bombing, and a dummy variable to indicate is the governor is a Republican.  Robust and clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** 





Determinants of the Homicide Rate 
Dropping Observations where Risk=0 and Denominator=0 
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
(EXEC2t / SENTt-5) -1 
-0.0052** 
(0.0022)     -0.0058**  
(0.0023) 
-0.0068***   
(0.0024) 
       
(COMM2t /SENTt-5) -1    0.0041 
(0.0045)    0.0054     
(0.0037)   
       
(REMOVE2t/SENTt-5) -1     0.0017** 
(0.0006)    0.0020*** 
(0.0007) 
       
n  398 398 398 398 398 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
(EXEC2t / SENTt-4) -1 
-0.0069* 
(0.0035)     -0.0069*  
(0.0036) 
-0.0071**   
(0.0034) 
       
(COMM2t /SENTt-4) -1    0.0019 
(0.0021)    0.0021 
(0.0019)   
       
(REMOVE2t/SENTt-4) -1     0.00002 
(0.0007)    0.0003 
(0.0006) 
       
n  426 426 426 426 426 
Donohue III & Wolfers Specification 
Duration on Death Row: 0 Years; Time between Arrest and Death Sentence: 0 Years 
 (EXEC2t / SENTt  )-1 
-0.0006 




       
 (COMM2t / SENTt  )-1    0.0034** 
(0.0013)    0.0034** 
(0.0013)   
       
 
(REMOVE2t / SENTt  )-1 
   -0.0005 
(0.0005)    -0.0005 
(0.0005) 
  543 543 543 543 543 
Each model includes the following variables: The murder arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the unemployment rate, real 
per capita income, the proportion of the state population in the following age groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and 
over, the proportion of the state population in urban areas, the proportion which is black, the infant mortality rate, the 
legal drinking age in the state, the number of prisoners per violent crime, and the prison death rate.  Also included in 
each model are state fixed-effects, a time trend, state-specific time trends, a dummy variable to control for the impact of 
the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and a dummy variable to indicate is the governor is a Republican.  Robust and 
clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical 





Determinants of the Homicide Rate 
 








       
 #Ct -1    -0.00008 
(0.0002)    -0.00009 
(0.0002)   
       
#Rt-1     0.00004 
(0.0001)    0.00005 
(0.0001) 
n  894 894 894 894 894 
#EXt denotes the raw counts of executions. #Ct denotes the raw counts of commutations, and #Rt  
denotes the raw counts of death row removals. Each model includes the following variables: The 
murder arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the unemployment rate, real per capita income, the 
proportion of the state population in the following age groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and 
over, the proportion of the state population in urban areas, the proportion which is black, the 
infant mortality rate, the legal drinking age in the state, the number of prisoners per violent crime, 
and the prison death rate.  Also included in each model are state fixed-effects, a time trend, state-
specific time trends, a dummy variable to control for the impact of the 1995 Oklahoma City 
bombing, and a dummy variable to indicate is the governor is a Republican.  Robust and clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, 
** statistical significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** statistical significance at the 1 percent 
level or better.  
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Table 13A  
Determinants of the Homicide Rate 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Unweighted Regressions 
Duration on death row: 5 years 
 (EXECt / SENTt-5 )-1 
-0.0042* 
(0.0022)     -0.0043**  
(0.0021) 
-0.0054**   
(0.0025) 
       
 (COMMt / SENTt-5 )-1    0.0079*** 
(0.0021)    0.0081*** 
(0.0020)   
       
 (REMOVEt / SENTt-5 )-1     0.0025*** 
(0.0008)    0.0028*** 
(0.0009) 
       
n  734 743 691 733 688 
Duration on death row: 4 years 
 (EXECt / SENTt-4 )-1 
-0.0037 
(0.0023)     -0.0036 
(0.0023) 
-0.0032   
(0.0023) 
       
 (COMMt / SENTt-4 )-1    0.0050*** 
(0.0008)    0.0050*** 
(0.0008)   
       
 (REMOVEt / SENTt-4 )-1     0.0015* 
(0.0008)    0.0016** 
(0.0007) 
       
n  785 790 744 781 741 
 
Donohue III & Wolfers Specification 
Duration on Death Row: 0 Years; Time between Arrest and Death Sentence: 0 Years 
 
 (EXECt / SENTt )-1 
-0.0004 




       
 (COMMt / SENTt )-1    0.0056** 
(0.0024)    0.0057** 
(0.0023)   
       
 (REMOVEt / SENTt )-1     0.00035 
(0.0002)    0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
n  986 984 921 977 918 
Each model includes the following variables: The murder arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the 
unemployment rate, real per capita income, the proportion of the state population in the following age 
groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and over, the proportion of the state population in urban areas, the 
proportion which is black, the infant mortality rate, the legal drinking age in the state, the number of 
prisoners per violent crime, and the prison death rate.  Also included in each model are state fixed-effects, a 
time trend, state-specific time trends, a dummy variable to control for the impact of the 1995 Oklahoma 
City bombing, and a dummy variable to indicate is the governor is a Republican.  Robust and clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** 




Table 13B  
Determinants of the Homicide Rate 
The Second measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Unweighted Regressions 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
 (EXECt / SENTt-5 )-1 
-0.0044** 
(0.0021)     -0.0046**  
(0.0022) 
-0.0053*   
(0.0027) 
       
 (COMMt / SENTt-5 )-1    0.0065** 
(0.0026)    0.0069***    
(0.0022)   
       
 (REMOVEt / SENTt-5 )-1     0.0017*** 
(0.0006)    0.0020*** 
(0.0007) 
       
n  737 743 712 736 709 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
 (EXECt / SENTt-4 )-1 
-0.0048 
(0.0038)     -0.0048  
(0.0038) 
-0.0047   
(0.0036) 
       
 (COMMt / SENTt-4 )-1    0.0046*** 
(0.0008)    0.0046*** 
(0.008)   
       
 (REMOVEt / SENTt-4 )-1     0.0011 
(0.0007)    0.0013 
(0.0007) 
       
n  785 792 761 783 758 
Donohue III & Wolfers Specification 
Duration on Death Row: 0 Years; Time between Arrest and Death Sentence: 0 years 
 (EXECt / SENTt )-1 
-0.0013 




       
 (COMMt / SENTt )-1    0.0044** 
(0.0021)    0.0045** 
(0.0021)   
       
 (REMOVEt / SENTt )-1     0.00003 
(0.0005)    0.00007 
(0.0005) 
n  989 990 952 984 949 
Each model includes the following variables: The murder arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the unemployment rate, real 
per capita income, the proportion of the state population in the following age groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and 
over, the proportion of the state population in urban areas, the proportion which is black, the infant mortality rate, the 
legal drinking age in the state, the number of prisoners per violent crime, and the prison death rate.  Also included in 
each model are state fixed-effects, a time trend, state-specific time trends, a dummy variable to control for the impact of 
the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and a dummy variable to indicate is the governor is a Republican.  Robust and 
clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical 




Determinants of the Homicide Rate (Excluding New York and New Jersey) 
Unweighted Regressions 
The First Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-5 )-1 
-0.0043** 
(0.0022)     -0.0044**  
(0.0021) 
-0.0056**   
(0.0025) 
        
(COMMt / SENTt-5 )-1    0.0077*** 
(0.0022)    0.0079***    
(0.0021)   
(REMOVEt / SENTt-5 )-1     0.0027*** 
(0.0008)    0.0030*** 
(0.0009) 
n  704 713 665  703  662 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-4 )-1 
-0.0038 
(0.0023)     -0.0036  
(0.0023) 
-0.0033*   
(0.0022) 
        
(COMMt / SENTt-4 )-1    0.0050*** 
(0.0007)    0.0049***    
(0.0007)   
(REMOVEt / SENTt-4 )-1     0.0017**  
(0.0008)    0.0018** 
(0.0008) 
n  753 758 716  749  713 
The Second Measure of Execution, Commutation, and Removal 
Duration on Death Row: 5 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-5 )-1 
-0.0044** 
(0.0022)     -0.0046**  
(0.0022) 
-0.0054**   
(0.0027) 
        
(COMMt / SENTt-5 )-1    0.0064** 
(0.0026)    0.0068***    
(0.0022)   
(REMOVEt / SENTt-5 )-1     0.0019*** 
(0.0006)    0.0021*** 
(0.0007) 
n  707 713 685  706  682 
Duration on Death Row: 4 years 
(EXECt / SENTt-4 )-1 
-0.0048 
(0.0038)     -0.0048  
(0.0038) 
-0.0049   
(0.0036) 
        
(COMMt / SENTt-4 )-1    0.0046*** 
(0.0008)    0.0045***    
(0.0009)   
(REMOVEt / SENTt-4 )-1     0.0013*  
(0.0007)    0.0015** 
(0.0007) 
n  753 760 732  751  729 
Each model includes the following variables: The murder arrest rate, the sentencing rate, the unemployment rate, real 
per capita income, the proportion of the state population in the following age groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and 
over, the proportion of the state population in urban areas, the proportion which is black, the infant mortality rate, the 
legal drinking age in the state, the number of prisoners per violent crime, and the prison death rate.  Also included in 
each model are state fixed-effects, a time trend, state-specific time trends, a dummy variable to control for the impact of 
the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and a dummy variable to indicate is the governor is a Republican.  Robust and 
clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance between 10 and 5 percent, ** statistical 
significance between 5 and 1 percent. *** statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better. 
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Table 15 
Summary of the Results 
Risk Measures in the Analysis (A/B)  The Impact on the Homicide Rate of 
the 






First Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
Death Sentences handed 
out 5 years prior (duration 










First Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
Death Sentences handed 
out 4 years prior (duration 










Second Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
Death Sentences handed 
out 5 years prior (duration 










Second Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
Death Sentences handed 
out 4 years prior (duration 










First Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
(D-III&W Specification) 
Death Sentences handed 
out the same year (duration 










Second Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
(D-III&W Specification) 
Death Sentences handed 
out the same year (duration 










First or Second Measures of 
Executions, Commutations, 
Removals 
Death Sentences handed 
out i, j, or k years prior for 
spells ending in year t 
(duration on death 
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First Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 









Second Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 









First Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 









Second Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 









The Raw Count of Executions 
(#EX), Commutations (#C), 
Removals (#R) 









The Raw Count of Executions 
(#EX), Commutations (#C), 
Removals (#R) 











The Raw Count of Executions 
(#EX), Commutations (#C), 
Removals (#R) 









First Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
(Unweighted Regression) 
Death Sentences handed 
out 5 years prior (duration 










First Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
(Unweighted Regression) 
Death Sentences handed 
out 4 years prior (duration 










Second Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
(Unweighted Regression) 
Death Sentences handed 
out 5 years prior (duration 











Second Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
(Unweighted Regression) 
Death Sentences handed 
out 4 years prior (duration 










First Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
Death Sentences handed 
out 7 years prior (duration 










Second Measures of Executions, 
Commutations, Removals 
Death Sentences handed 
out 7 years prior (duration 











A  + (--) indicates that the coefficient is positive (negative) in at least 2 of the 3 regressions pertinent to that specification.   A * 
indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant in at least 2 of the 3 specifications.  The details are reported in various tables in 
the paper.  Note that a number of specifications summarized in this table are inconsistent with theory.  They are estimated and reported 
here as part of sensitivity analysis.  Note also that this table is not an exhaustive summary of the models estimated in the paper.  Other 
models, which are not reported in the interest of space in this table, are consistent with the pattern displayed here.  Those results are 
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Figure 3A
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Figure 1B
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Figure 3B
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Figure 5B
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Figure 1C 
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Figure 3C
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Figure 5C
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Figure 7C
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Figure 9C
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